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Evidence’s #MeToo Moment 
ANÍBAL ROSARIO-LEBRÓN* 
The #MeToo movement has drawn attention to the preva-
lence of sexual and gender-based violence. But more im-
portantly, it has exposed how society discounts the testimony 
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of women. This Article unfolds how this credibility discount-
ing is reinforced in our evidentiary system through the use 
of character for untruthfulness evidence to impeach victims. 
Specifically, through defense attorneys’ practice of im-
peaching sexual and gender-based violence victims’ charac-
ter for truthfulness as a way to introduce functional evidence 
of credibility biases regarding the trustworthiness of sexual 
and gender-based violence victims and the plausibility of 
their testimonies. The Article further shows a correlation be-
tween the poor performance of our legal system in redress-
ing the harms associated with sexual and gender-based vio-
lence and our evidentiary rules. Accordingly, the Article ad-
vocates reforming the use of character for untruthfulness ev-
idence and proposes a rule that attempts to temper the prej-
udicial effects caused by long-held credibility biases against 
sexual and gender-based violence victims with a well-estab-
lished impeachment tradition, constitutional protections, 
and judicial efficiency. It does so in hopes that the #MeToo 
movement becomes a catalyst in the judicial response 
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#FEM2: INTRODUCTION 
Well the icecaps are melting pretty fast and the change here [in 
workplace sexual harassment] seems to be glacially slow. But I will 
say, that if we do nothing the change is not gonna come.1  
                                                                                                             
 1 LastWeekTonight, Workplace Sexual Harassment: Last Week Tonight 
with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (July 29, 2018), https://www.youtube. com/ 
watch?v= dHiAls8loz4 [hereinafter Last Week Tonight with John Oliver] (Profes-
sor Anita Hill discussing the changes our judicial system has experienced in re-
dressing sexual harassment and SGBV at 28:15–28:30). 
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Historically, in sexual and gender-based violence (“SGBV”) 
cases,2  women have been doubly victimized.3 With the rise of social 
                                                                                                             
 2 The term sexual and gender-based violence cases will be used in this Arti-
cle as an umbrella term for cases in which the majority of victims are women and 
its violence has a gender or sexual component such as sexual harassment, rape, 
sexual assault, intimate partner violence, stealthing, upskirting, and similar ag-
gressions. 
[SGBV] refers to harm or threat of harm perpetrated against a 
person based on her/his gender. It is rooted in unequal power 
relationships between men and women; thus, women are more 
commonly affected. It is often used interchangeably with “vio-
lence against women” and can include sexual, physical, eco-
nomic and psychological abuse. SGBV manifests in various 
forms including physical, emotional and sexual violence, sex-
ual exploitation, discrimination and harassment. 
ALYS M. WILLMAN & CRYSTAL CORMAN, WORLD BANK, SEXUAL AND GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE: WHAT IS THE WORLD BANK DOING, AND WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? A STRATEGIC REVIEW 5 (2013), https://openknowledge. 
worldbank.org/handle/10986/16733. “This does not mean that all acts against a 
woman are gender-based violence, or that all victims of gender-based violence 
are female.” Definitions of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, NEW 
HUMANITARIAN (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fea-
ture/2004/09/01/definitions-sexual-and-gender-based-violence. Men who do not 
conform to society’s views of masculinity could be victims of SGBV. Id. 
Although reliable figures are difficult to compile, it is estimated that between 
1993 and 2001 eighty-five percent of intimate partner violence victims were 
women. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003), 
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. Similarly, it is estimated that less than 
two percent of men in the United States—as opposed to twenty percent of 
women—will be raped. See Get Statistics, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., 
https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737 (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). The proportion of 
reported cases of rape and sexual assault in the United Sates show a similar trend, 
with a ratio of about 1:10 (men to women). See Number of Forcible Rape and 
Sexual Assault Victims in the United States from 1993 to 2017, by Sex, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/251923/usa--reported-forcible-rape-cases-by-
gender/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2019); Number of Rape or Sexual Assault Victims 
in the United States per Year from 2000 to 2017, by Gender, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/642458/rape-and-sexual-assault-victims-in-
the-us- by-gender/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2019). The pattern repeats itself in cases 
of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment 
(Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2018, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sex-
ual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Charges Alleg-
ing Sex-Based Harassment]. The EEOC reports that in the last nine years males 
are on average 16.8% of the complainants. See id. 
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awareness about the embodiment of patriarchal norms in our legal 
system, we reformed our probative and substantive laws to no longer 
require corroborative testimony,4 in an attempt to put somewhat of 
a stop to victim-blaming and slut-shaming in court.5 
Today, the #MeToo movement, originated by Tarana Burke, is 
raising social awareness about rape culture and credibility biases 
against SGBV victims.6 As a result, men have been forced to 
acknowledge their patriarchal behavior and resign from positions of 
power.7 Nevertheless, reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates 
remain well below acceptable levels and have even fallen.8 
This Article argues that, while some of the discounting of narra-
tives denounced by the #MeToo movement has been partially erad-
icated from the judicial process,9 there is a correlation between the 
                                                                                                             
Consequently, although males are also targets of SGBV, throughout the Article 
feminine pronouns will be used to refer to victims, except in the proposed rule 
that will use gender-neutral language to maintain its constitutionality. See infra 
Sections IV.B, V.B. 
It is also important to stress that, although this Article focuses on how gender 
intersects with credibility, understanding how gender intersects with race, reli-
gion, class, and other identities is critical to addressing patterns and forms of sex-
ual and gender-based violence. See, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths 
and Preserving Power: Deconstructing White Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the 
Rape Corroboration Rule in the Interest of Black Liberation, 40 HOW. L.J. 459, 
474–75 (1997) (discussing allegations of rape when made by and against African 
Americans); Nesa E. Wasarhaley et al., The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Le-
gal Perceptions of Lesbian Intimate Partner Violence, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 635, 651–53 (2015) (discussing credibility discounting of same-sex 
couples). 
 3 See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with Noncorroboration Instruc-
tions, 53 TULSA L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2017). 
 5 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 6 Stephanie Zacharek et al., Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, 
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-
breakers/. 
 7 See Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. 
Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html (last updated Oct. 
29, 2018). 
 8 See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L 
NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2019). 
 9 See, e.g., Buller, supra note 4, at 13–15. 
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poor performance of our legal system in addressing SGBV cases and 
our evidentiary rules. Specifically, this Article posits that neutral 
rules regarding the impeachment of a witnesses’ character for un-
truthfulness are used in practice by attorneys to discount victims’ 
testimonies through credibility biases based on trustworthiness and 
testimony plausibility.10 
As a possible solution, this Article advocates enacting impeach-
ment rules that would prevent attorneys from using societal narra-
tives about victims’ perceived lack of credibility and working them 
in as part of the defense. The proposed rule,11 based on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), attempts to temper the prejudicial ef-
fects caused by credibility biases with a long-standing tradition of 
impeaching witnesses with evidence of character for untruthfulness, 
constitutional protections, and judicial efficiency. The Rule pro-
vides for different balancing tests depending on the type of character 
for untruthfulness evidence and lists concrete factors to aid the court 
in SGBV cases when weighing the probative value of the character 
for untruthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects. 
The Article opens with a short story that sheds light on some of 
the discounting that SGBV victims often experience when they 
come to court to vindicate their grievances.12 The Article then ex-
plores how these unjust experiences are part of an evidentiary sys-
tem that, through the impeachment of victims’ character for truth-
fulness, discounts women’s voices by not gatekeeping credibility bi-
ases from SGBV trials.13 After describing this phenomenon, this Ar-
ticle presents how SGBV continues to be a pressing issue in our so-
ciety and how the low reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates 
correlate with the undue exploitation of credibility biases in trials.14 
Next, it explores the current evidentiary landscape in the United 
States regarding the impeachment of SGBV victims with character 
for untruthfulness evidence and the costs of keeping an evidentiary 
system that reinforces SGBV through credibility biases.15 After the 
problem is explained, the Article includes a model impeachment 
                                                                                                             
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Section IV.B. 
 12 See infra Part I. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra Part III. 
 15 See infra Section IV.A. 
8 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
rule, as well as a commentary explaining the rule and its applica-
tion.16 Finally, the Article discusses the benefits and disadvantages 
of implementing the rule.17 
I. #METOO: A NOT CREDIBLE WITNESS 
I dreaded that moment. Their silent treatment. Their faces of dis-
appointment. The look in their eyes letting me know that I have 
failed them. 
I was so terrified of that moment. I could feel the chills going 
through my spine. It was worse than the punishment itself. The look 
on their faces said it all. I lied. I misbehaved. I deserved no mercy. 
I went all throughout my childhood trying to avoid that feeling. 
Yet, as I grew older, I kept running into it. 
It was different for sure. It was no longer my parents. It was then 
my friends’, my teachers’, and my colleagues’ turn. Even though I 
hadn’t done anything wrong, it felt like I had. Like I was a child and 
had broken an old vase in the living room. It still felt like I had lied, 
like I had misbehaved. But the only thing broken was me. 
If a high school teacher made unsolicited sexual advances and I 
said something about it, I’d have to respond to a myriad of questions. 
Did I misunderstand the situation? Had I asked for it? Was it my 
fault for staying alone with him? Was I deflecting? Was I lying be-
cause I did not get the highest grade? Was I making a big deal out 
of nothing? 
I quickly learned to keep silent. If I did not want to be made a 
liar, it was better to shut up. If I wanted a future, it was better to let 
it go than to taint my reputation. 
I thought I had learned all the tricks. Never be alone with your 
boss. Never walk by yourself late at night. Make sure you know the 
men you go out with well. Ask other women what they’ve heard. 
Yet, here I am again. Three decades later, feeling those same 
chills. 
I thought this time was going to be different. They told me to 
break the silence. They told me to tell my story. They told me there 
were other women like me. 
But the look in their eyes said it all. The foreman, the jurors, the 
judge. 
                                                                                                             
 16 See infra Sections IV.B–IV.D. 
 17 See infra Part V. 
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I told the truth. It didn’t matter. I cooperated with the police. It 
didn’t matter. I came forward. It didn’t matter. 
The look was there. Lingering, like his beatings. I had lied. I 
misbehaved. I deserved no mercy. 
Initially, I did not intend to be in court for the verdict. But my 
family and friends convinced me otherwise. They said I should keep 
my head high. However, I knew from the moment I took the stand 
that he was going to walk. 
This trial was never about him. It was about me not coming for-
ward promptly, me keeping silence in my own hell, me lying to keep 
appearances, me putting on makeup, me not stopping going to work. 
It was about whatever it was that I did that they could not under-
stand. 
This case was not about how many times he hit me, how many 
times he yelled at me, or how he made me feel. It was not about how 
many times he pushed me against the wall or raped me. 
It was about the people who didn’t know about it. The people 
who didn’t see it. The people I didn’t tell about it. 
It was about him saying that he is not the kind of man that would 
do such things, but I am the kind of woman who would make such 
things up. It was about me being unreliable, unstable, and perhaps 
scorned. 
What type of car do you have, Jennifer? 
As soon as his attorney asked that question, I knew it was over 
for me. 
An Audi. Why? 
Objection, your Honor! The prosecutor intervened. 
Your Honor, this question is related to the credibility of the wit-
ness. 
Your Honor, I fail to see how this is related to the credibility of 
the victim. 
Your Honor, if I may? 
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Sidebar please, the judge commanded. 
No one was supposed to hear what they were discussing, but I 
did. His attorney was arguing how he had evidence that I mali-
ciously lied in a loan application and that it will show my character 
for untruthfulness. Since all the State had was my testimony against 
that of my ex, the information was extremely relevant. The prosecu-
tor did not even reply, and the judge just nodded and said: “Get to 
the point right away.” 
Jennifer, you took a loan for that car, no? 
Yes, I did. 
Isn’t it true that you lied in the loan application? 
I don’t know what you are talking about. That was like six years 
ago. 
Do you remember completing a loan application to buy the car? 
Yes. 
Do you remember lying about your income? 
I don’t think so. 
The attorney kept looking at his papers, like he was searching 
for something. I started wondering if he had my loan application 
with him and was about to show it to the court. 
Are you sure that you didn’t write that you made 45k when you 
applied for the loan? He kept looking. 
I might have. 
But that was not your income at the time? 
I think a friend told me to . . . 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 11 
I didn’t ask you about what your “friend” told you. I asked you 
about what you wrote in the application. Did you write 45k when 
you were making less than that? 
Yes. 
So, you lied, correct? 
I guess you can say I did. I followed my friend’s advice. 
But the application was in your name, no? 
Yes. 
You were not married to my client at the time? 
No. 
But you made everyone think you were. 
Excuse me? 
Objection, your Honor! Relevance? The prosecutor interjected. 
Your Honor, we are trying to get at the credibility of this witness. 
Overruled. The judge disinterestedly intervened. 
I will repeat my question. At that time, six years ago, did you go 
by Mrs. Johnson or Miss Jones? 
I don’t understand. 
Did your manager at your job call you Mrs. Johnson? 
Well . . . the manager of the office knew Mark, and he thought 
that we were married. I did not want to give any explanations 
about us. It was easier to do that. 
So, when it is easier for you, you lie? 
No. I did not say that. 
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So, when you don’t want to give explanations you lie? 
No. I did not say that. 
But you lied to your manager, no? 
No. 
Well . . . legally you were Miss Jones, no? 
Yes. 
And you referred to yourself as Mrs. Johnson with your man-
ager, correct? 
Yes. We were not married at the time, but we were living to-
gether, so people referred to me as Mrs. Johnson. 
But that was not your legal name, right? 
No. 
So, you were lying, no? 
I wouldn’t say that. 
Let’s go back to the car. You did not tell Mark that you were 
buying a car, right? 
No. 
Of course! As you testified, he allegedly wouldn’t let you buy 
even a cell phone, so he wouldn’t have let you buy a car, am I 
correct? 
I don’t think he would’ve. No. 
But you did apply for a loan, right? 
Yes. 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 13 
So, you took a loan behind Mark’s back, behind the back of the 
man you called your “husband”? 
It wasn’t behind his back. 
But he didn’t know? 
No, he did not know. 
I could see the face of the lady in the second row of the jury box 
and I knew exactly what she was thinking. “This woman is a liar. 
Look at her. She doesn’t look like a victim at all.” I should’ve lis-
tened to my mom when she told me that no one was going to believe 
me if I look like nothing had happened. “Victims don’t dress like 
you do, Jen. They look sad. You look too attractive.” And then, all 
a sudden, the attorney went for what I thought was the final blow. 
You eventually married my client, right? 
Yes. 
In fact, you are still married to him? 
Yes. I’m in the process . . . 
Now. Mrs. Johnson, did you recently take a pregnancy test? 
Objection! The State’s attorney jumped from her chair. 
Again, the attorneys came to the bench. This time the prosecutor 
was more forceful in her defense. She insisted that the pregnancy 
test had nothing to do with the case. That it was impermissible to 
use that type of evidence. His attorney insisted that it was to prove 
my deceitful character, not to pry into my sexual life. The judge 
simply said, “I’ll allow it.” 
Please answer my question, Mrs. Johnson. Did you take recently 
a pregnancy test? 
Yes. I went to my doctor’s and she ordered one for me. 
14 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
It has been more than six months since you have lived with my 
client, correct? 
That’s correct. 
But you are still married to him, no? 
Yes, I am . . . We are in the middle of the divorce process. 
In that divorce you are asking for alimony, no? 
Yes. I think my attorney asked for it. 
And for full custody of your children? 
Yes. 
Now, Jennifer, did you try to kill yourself? 
I expected the question. 
Yes. It was a difficult time. I was depressed. 
Did you think about your children? 
Objection?! 
Sustained. 
Apologies, your Honor. Were your depressed or are you still de-
pressed? 
Well . . . I’m still in treatment. As I said, it has been a difficult 
time. 
And when you tried to take your life, it was just a few days after 
your relationship with Mark ended, no? 
Yes. But that wasn’t . . . 
In fact, he left you, no? 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 15 
That’s right. 
But just two weeks after your suicide attempt, you let Mark into 
your house. 
No. He showed up. 
Thanks. In your testimony, you mentioned that around that time 
you decided not to have anything else to do with Mark, right? 
Yes. 
But you let him in. 
I didn’t have the strength to . . . 
You did not have the strength to call the police? 
No, I did. But I did not mean that. 
Your kids were not with you, no? 
No. They were with my parents. 
So, you did not call the police when Mark showed up? 
No. 
Even though you alleged that he had hit you many times before, 
right? 
No, I did not call the police at that moment. 
And no one could verify that he has hit you before, right? 
No one was at our house when he hit me. 
And you did not call the police when he showed up even though 
you allege that he raped you in the past. 
No. 
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And you never told anyone about him raping you before until 
this trial, right? 
That’s correct. 
Not even your mom? 
No. 
Or your friends? 
No. 
In fact, you told the police when you made the report that you 
have never been the victim of domestic violence. No? 
Yes. I meant that . . . 
Just a simple yes or no will do. In fact, you told your friends and 
family how happy you were with Mark? 
Yes. I didn’t want people to know . . . 
And on Facebook, you were always talking about all the nice 
things Mark would do for you? 
Yes. As I told you, I did not want people to know. 
You never said on Facebook that he raped you, no? 
That’s not something you post on Facebook. 
So, that was a no? 
Yes. That was a no. 
And you had sex with him that night he “showed up” at your 
house, no? 
No. He raped me. 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 17 
But you did not have any bruising on your arms when the police 
came? 
No. 
Or anywhere on your body, isn’t that correct? 
That’s correct. I did not have any bruising. That doesn’t mean 
he did not rape me. 
I could see in the foreman’s eyes. He was certain that I was lying 
because I never shared with anyone that he was abusing me. He 
thought that I was unstable. He was sure that I had sex voluntarily 
with him and that I was being vindictive and jealous because he left. 
So, you called the police when he was in the bathroom and he 
was about to leave, right? 
Yes. That was when I . . . 
And the police took you to the hospital, right? 
Yes. I was very anxious. 
And in the hospital, they administered a rape kit on you, no? 
No. I did not say, at that moment, that he had raped me. 
So, this is the first time you have told someone that my client, 
your husband, who you let in your house, allegedly raped you? 
Yes. 
Now, my client went to check on you after your suicide attempt, 
no? 
That’s what he said when he showed up at my doorstep. 
No more questions, your Honor. 
Then it came down to the closing. 
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As the attorney went into his argument, I remembered the bed-
time stories my mom used to tell me as a child about how the wolf 
came, and no one believed the shepherd boy. That day, I was the 
shepherd. But this time I wasn’t being believed not for what I said 
but for what I did not say. 
“‘Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned, nor hell a fury 
like a woman scorned.’18 We are here today because of Jennifer’s 
scorn.” The defense attorney yelled. “She is a person who would lie 
when she sees fit. You heard her tell you how she lied about the 
relationship she had with my client. She pretended to be his wife. 
And after getting what she wanted, when he decided to call it quits, 
she lied again, like she did in her loan application. She is just looking 
to ruin this honest man’s life. The man who, before leaving, she was 
telling everybody how well he treated her. 
There is no victim in this case. Or yes, there is one: my client. A 
man whose life is about to get ruined because of this woman’s lies. 
She is trying to ruin Mark’s life by lying. Just like she told you she 
does when she doesn’t want to give explanations, when it’s easier 
for her to get what she wants, when she really wants something that 
she can’t have like a car, my client, or money. Like she lied here in 
court when she told you that my client wouldn’t let her buy a cell 
phone when she was buying things more expensive and less easily 
concealable. Things that—if it were true that my client wanted to 
control her—she would not have been able to have. But we all know 
that she was lying about the cell phone, as she was lying about the 
punches, the restrictions, and the insults. 
We all know that she was lying about being raped. Who lets an 
abuser come into her house when the relationship has ended? Who 
doesn’t tell the police she has been raped? No one. It’s a lie. A lie 
from an unstable woman, a woman who hasn’t been able to deal 
with her depression. 
And if you have any doubts, look at the other witnesses the State 
brought. Who does she have to support her story? Her parents. Her 
friends. People who would do anything for her. People who did not 
like my client in the first place. People who were not present at any 
of the alleged instances of abuse. People who, as Mrs. Johnson did, 
lied to you. 
                                                                                                             
 18 WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE MOURNING BRIDE act 3, sc. 2. (original spelling 
has been modernized). 
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But you know better than that. You know my client is incapable 
of the atrocities that he has been accused of. And you know Jennifer. 
You know she is capable of lying to get her way.” 
But I did not “get my way.” He did. 
I just kept my head high. 
II. #BELIEVEHER: DISCOUNTING SGBV VICTIMS WITH 
CHARACTER FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS EVIDENCE 
All wickedness is but little to the wickedness of a woman.19 
 
Jennifer’s story is more common than what we would like to 
think. In fact, her story is based on a fairly publicized intimate part-
ner violence case in Puerto Rico between a then-legislator and 
hisspouse.20 As both fiction and reality demonstrate, discounting 
                                                                                                             
 19 Ecclesiasticus, 25:19 (King James). 
 20 Liza Yajaira Rivera Colón pressed charges against her husband, attorney 
and legislator Luis Farinacci, for domestic violence. See Esposa del legislador 
Luis Farinacci Morales relata patrón violencia doméstica [Wife of Legislator 
Luis Farinacci Morales Recounts Pattern of Domestic Violence], PRIMERA HORA 
(Aug. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.primerahora.com/noticias/puerto-rico 
/nota/esposadellegisladorluisfarinaccimoralesrelatapatronvioleciadomestica-409 
310/. The defense attorney in the case, Pablo Colón, impeached Liza Yajaira’s 
credibility to argue that the accusations were aimed at destroying his client. Cues-
tionan credibilidad de esposa de Farinacci [Credibility of Farinacci’s Wife Ca-
lled into Question], EL NUEVO DÍA, https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/poli-
tica/nota/cuestionancredibilidaddeesposadefarinacci-811028/ (last updated Nov. 
3, 2010, 6:04 PM); Liza Yajaira niega que quisiera destruir a Farinacci [Liza 
Yajaira Denies Attempting to Destroy Farinacci], EL NUEVO DÍA, 
https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/lizayajairaniegaquequisiera-
destruirafarinacci-997334/ (last updated June 21, 2011, 7:12 PM); No culpable el 
exrepresentante Farinacci de violencia doméstica [Former Representative Fari-
nacci Acquitted of Domestic Violence], EL NUEVO DÍA, https://www.elnue-
vodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/noculpableelexrepresentantefarinaccideviolen-
ciadomestica-1008503/ (last updated June 5, 2011, 10:40 PM). 
Liza Yajaira’s case inspired this Article and my first reflection on this topic in 
2011. See Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, Atando los cabos sueltos del machismo en el 
sistema judicial de Puerto Rico [Tying up the Loose Ends of Machismo in the 
Judicial System of Puerto Rico], DERECHOALDERECHO (Aug. 17, 2011), http://de-
rechoalderecho.org/2011/08/17/atando-los-cabos-sueltos-del-machismo-en-el-
sistema-judicial-de-puerto-rico/. After proposing a reform to the Puerto Rican 
Rules of Evidence to address the impeachment of domestic violence victims, I 
decided to research deeper the use of character for untruthfulness evidence in the 
context of SGBV victims. See Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, Scorned Law: Rethinking 
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victims in SGBV cases by impeaching their credibility is part of a 
larger defense strategy to deny the charges or to boost other de-
fenses.21 
This is not a new occurrence. Our legal system has a long patri-
archal history of discounting women’s credibility during trials and 
adversely affecting the fair prosecution of crimes committed against 
them.22 For example, in rape cases, our legal system has historically 
required corroboration testimony,23 prompt outcry,24 and cautionary 
                                                                                                             
Evidentiary Rules in Cases of Gender-Based Violence, CONCURRING OPINIONS 
(Feb. 16, 2014), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/02/scorned-law-
rethinking-evidentiary-rules-in-cases-of-gender-based-violence.html. The ideas 
from those early reflections culminated in this Article. 
 21 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 
19–21 (1999) (discussing how The Little Mermaid is an example of a tale built 
upon intergender sexual behaviors that illustrates a cultural rape narrative of 
women lying about rape); Carolyn Copps Hartley, “He Said, She Said”: The De-
fense Attack of Credibility in Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 7 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 510, 522–34 (2001) (describing study of strategies used by the 
defense attorneys in domestic violence felony cases); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Cred-
ibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, JUDGES’ J., Winter 1995, at 5, 
5–6, 40–41 (explaining credibility biases against women); Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 11–13 (2017) (illustrating how rape allegations have been always inter-
twined with questions about victims’ credibility); see also Denise R. Johnson, 
Prior False Allegations of Rape: Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Ominibus?, 7 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 243, 271–72 (1995) (discussing the effects of using prior vic-
tim’s alleged false allegations of wrongdoing); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the 
Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of the 
Truth, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV 123, 150–51 (1992) (explaining how SGBV victims 
are not believed for their customary inconsistent behavior). 
 22 See Buller, supra note 4, at 9–13. 
 23 See id. at 9–15 (describing the historical context of the corroboration re-
quirement and the rape-reform movement); see also Crooms, supra note 2, at 
469–70, 477–78 (discussing how rape corroboration rules rested in assumptions 
about credibility based on sex and race). 
 24 See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Require-
ment, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sex-
ual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 964–68 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson, Legacy]; 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 22–25. 
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jury instructions.25 It has also allowed the use of victims’ prior sex-
ual history26 and social companion defenses.27 However, the im-
peachment of SGBV victims’ character for truthfulness is a subtler 
and perhaps more pernicious patriarchal vestige as it shields itself 
behind the neutral façade of character for untruthfulness evidence.28 
The mechanism by which our evidentiary system operates is 
quite simple.29 It allows not only the impeachment of witnesses’ 
credibility with their character for untruthfulness through reputation 
or opinion testimony,30 but also through evidence of prior specific 
                                                                                                             
 25 Anderson, Legacy, supra note 24, at 973–77. 
 26 See Michelle J. Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield Laws: Kobe Bryant 
Case Highlights Holes in the Armor, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2014, at 14, 15 [here-
inafter Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield Laws] (detailing how in the ‘70s 
and early ‘80s jurisdictions in the United States adopted rape shield statutes to 
prevent jurors from giving less credence to victims based on their sexual histories 
and avoid jurors deciding cases based on stereotypes about complainants’ sexual 
histories). 
 27 Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 26–27. 
 28 See Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 
190–92, 200–01 (2017) [hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy] (discuss-
ing how impeachment rules related to character for (un)truthfulness enforce a cul-
tural conception of who is worthy of belief, not an actual view of truth, in the 
context of race and gender). 
 29 The analysis in this Part is based on the FRE, which are followed in the 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States. See id. at 186 (“Most states have 
gradually adopted the Federal Rules’ approach to impeachment, and dual focus 
on crimes and character evidence is nearly universal.”); Bennett Capers, Evidence 
Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 872 (2018) [hereinafter Capers, Ev-
idence Without Rules] (“In a very real sense, the Federal Rules of Evidence are 
the Rules of Evidence.”). For a discussion on the distinctions of the relevant rules 
between the FRE and other jurisdictions and the implications of such differences, 
see infra Section IV.A. 
 30 For example, FRE 608, titled “A Witness’s Character for Truthfulness 
or Untruthfulness,” in pertinent part, provides the following: 
(a) REPUTATION OR OPINION EVIDENCE. A witness’s credibility 
may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s 
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that char-
acter. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after 
the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked. 
FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
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acts.31 As to specific acts, the FRE distinguish between criminal 
acts32 and other bad acts related to untruthfulness.33 Although these 
                                                                                                             
 31 For example, FRE 608 and 609, respectively, allow the use of prior acts 
and criminal convictions for the impeachment of a witness. See FED. R. EVID. 
608(b), 609. 
Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part: 
Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part: 
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Except for a criminal con-
viction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 
prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to prove 
specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or 
support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court 
may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if 
they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-
examined   has testified about.  
FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
As to prior criminal convictions, Rule 609, “Impeachment by Evi-
dence of a Criminal Conviction,” states: 
Rule 609 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) IN GENERAL. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character 
for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: 
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by 
death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence: 
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a 
criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and  
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a 
defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to that defendant; and 
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be 
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the ele-
ments of the crime required proving – or the witness’s admitting – a 
dishonest act or false statement.  
FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 32 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 33 See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
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exceptions to the prohibition against character evidence34 are predi-
cated on truth seeking,35 the notion that people who lie in one con-
text would lie in others has been disproven.36 Yet, because our sys-
tem emphasizes the adversarial discovery of the truth through the 
presentation of conflicting versions, the honesty of each witness is 
crucial in deciding which of the conflicting accounts is the truth.37 
Thus, any evidence somewhat probative of how honest the witness 
is could be admissible in spite of the risks of confusion or skewing 
the perception of truth.38 
The importance of a witness’s credibility implicates how attor-
neys litigate,39 which in turn affects the structure of the rules of im-
peachment based on character for untruthfulness.40 As Professor 
Méndez explains, 
                                                                                                             
 34 FRE 404 precludes the admission of character evidence; however, the 
Rules provide for exceptions under Rules 607, 608, and 609. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 35 See Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign 
Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 565–68 (1992). 
 36 See id. at 546–49, 565–66; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Gro-
tesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most 
Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 763–64 (2008); Jonathan 
D. Kurland, Character as a Process in Judgment and Decision-Making and Its 
Implications for the Character Evidence Prohibition in Anglo-American Law, 38 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 143–48 (2014); Miguel A. Méndez, California’s New 
Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent 
Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1051–53 (1984) [hereinafter 
Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence]; Roger C. Park & Mi-
chael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdiscipli-
nary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 964–68 (2006); Anna Roberts, Conviction by 
Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1996 (2016); Simon-Kerr, Credibility 
by Proxy, supra note 28, at 208–09. 
 37 See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (1967) (“[W]e must 
look to the legitimate purpose of impeachment which is, of course, not to show 
that the accused who takes the stand is a ‘bad’ person but rather to show back-
ground facts which bear directly on whether jurors ought to believe him rather 
than other and conflicting witnesses.”). 
 38 See Miguel A. Méndez, V. Witnesses: Conforming the California Evidence 
Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (2005) 
[hereinafter Méndez, V. Witnesses]; Jenn Montan, Comment, N.J.R.E. 608 and 
Specific Instances of Conduct: The Time Has Come for New Jersey to Join the 
Majority, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 459–62 (2019). 
 39 See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465. 
 40 See infra Sections II.A–II.B. 
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[t]rial lawyers know that the outcome of a trial will 
be determined in almost all cases by the witnesses the 
jurors choose to believe and the ones they decide to 
ignore. Telling jurors which witnesses to believe or 
disbelieve is thus a crucial part of a closing argument. 
But such an appeal will not be persuasive unless the 
lawyer can give the jurors reasons rooted in the evi-
dence about why a witness should be believed or dis-
believed. This inescapable dynamic of jury trials en-
courages lawyers to produce the most favorable evi-
dence about the credibility of their witnesses and the 
most unfavorable about their opponents. Rules of ev-
idence generally counter this inclination by placing 
strict limits on the use of evidence to support or at-
tack the credibility of witnesses. Despite the unques-
tioned relevance of such evidence, the rules proceed 
on the assumption that the unrestrained use of evi-
dence on witness credibility may distract and confuse 
jurors about the substantive issues to be decided.41 
For that reason, except for convictions for prior felonies42 and 
crimen falsi,43 the impeachment based on character for untruthful-
ness is subject to the balancing of prejudice required by FRE 403.44 
                                                                                                             
 41 Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465 (emphasis added). 
 42 FED. R. EVID. 609. For example, FRE 609(a)(1)(B) provides for the admis-
sion of a prior felony conviction if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial 
effect, a higher standard than FRE 403. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). Further limits 
are placed on prior felony convictions that are more than ten years old, have been 
the subject of a pardon, or were the subject of juvenile adjudication. See FED. R. 
EVID. 609(b)–(d). 
 43 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). A crimen falsi is an “offense that involves some 
element of dishonesty or false statement.” Crimen falsi, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Roberts, supra note 24, at 1983. 
 44 FRE 403, entitled “Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, 
Waste of Time or Other Reasons,” reads as follows: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence. 
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Under FRE 403, the court has the discretion to exclude evidence of 
character for untruthfulness or prevent questioning in such matters 
if the evidence is ineffective towards aiding in the determination of 
truth, is unfairly prejudicial, leads to confusion of the issues, or mis-
leads the jury.45 Likewise, FRE 611 limits the use of character for 
untruthfulness evidence on cross-examination when use of that evi-
dence constitutes harassment.46 
The final protection put in place when attorneys impeach a wit-
ness with evidence of character for untruthfulness comes when the 
evidence used is in the form of specific acts. In that case, the use of 
extrinsic evidence to support the previous act of untruthfulness is 
precluded unless it is evidence of a conviction allowed under FRE 
609.47 In other words, in order to undermine the credibility of the 
witness through specific acts, the attorney must do so without pre-
senting any documentary evidence to support the inquiry.48 As a re-
sult, the answers given by the witness are as far as an attorney can 
go.49 Purportedly, the reasons for excluding extrinsic evidence in-
                                                                                                             
FED. R. EVID. 403. See also Roberts, supra note 36, at 1983 (explaining how con-
victions under FRE 609(a)(1)(B) must be admitted irrespective of its probative 
value or prejudicial effect). 
 45 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 46 FRE 611, in pertinent part, establishes the following: 
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence 
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasona-
ble control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and pre-
senting evidence so as to: 
(1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; 
(2) avoid wasting time; and 
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
 47 FED. R. EVID. 608 (precluding impeachment by introduction of extrinsic 
evidence of specific acts, except where permitted under Rule 609); FED. R. EVID. 
609 (permitting introduction of extrinsic evidence of certain prior convictions to 
impeach for untruthfulness). There are other limits regarding prior convictions 
(remoteness, pardon, annulment, rehabilitation, or juvenile adjudications). See 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b)–(d). 
 48 See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609. 
 49 See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609. This does not mean that extrinsic evidence or 
its shadow does not find its way into the jurors’ attention. Capers, Evidence With-
out Rules, supra note 29, at 871, 895. As Professor Bennett Capers points out, 
there is functional evidence that escapes the gatekeeping directives of the FRE. 
Id. at 871 (2018) (explaining the term functional evidence as evidence that is not 
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clude avoiding distracting the jury from the matter being adjudi-
cated, limiting undue delay, preventing confusion of the issues, and 
precluding the unfair treatment of witnesses.50 Yet, in SGBV cases, 
as this Article will explain, the use of prior acts of untruthfulness 
exacerbates jury confusion, treats victim witnesses unfairly, and dis-
tracts adjudicators from the matter to be judged.51 
Previous acts of untruthfulness are the most powerful type of 
character evidence in an attorney’s repertoire.52 This is remarkably 
true in cases of SGBV, which are often described as “he said/she 
said” contests,53 where perceptions of credibility are already skewed 
against the victims.54 In SGBV cases, like Jennifer’s case,55 attor-
neys impeach the victim’s credibility with specific acts of untruth-
                                                                                                             
regulated by the FRE but is used by jurors in their fact-finding role). In Jennifer’s 
case, for example, the shadow of the extrinsic evidence of the loan application 
comes into evidence by the simple flickering of documents by defense counsel 
when inquiring into whether Jennifer recalls the details of her false statement. 
 50 Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62; see Okun, supra note 35, at 544; see 
also Kassandra Altantulkhuur, Note, A Second Rape: Testing Victim Credibility 
Through Prior False Accusations, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2018). 
 51 See infra Section II.B.2.; Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62. 
 52 Michael D. Schwartz & Phillip R. Maltin, Strength of Character: The Ad-
missibility of Character Evidence in Civil Trials is Subject to Exacting Standards, 
L.A. LAW., June 2010, at 26, 26–28 (2010). 
 53 Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. Most of these cases happen in private with 
no witnesses but the people implicated, giving the sense to others that it is a swear-
ing contest between the victim and the alleged perpetrator. Id. at 527, 535–36. 
 54 See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 (pointing out how “[d]espite several de-
cades of a renewed women’s movement and increasing attention to the problem 
of rape, judges and juries continue to be skeptical of rape, demanding greater 
proof than for many other types of crimes and demonstrating deep suspicion of 
victims.”); Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. In reality, “[f]ormulations such as ‘no-
body really knows what happened’ in the cases of sexual assault and rape, for 
example, work to discredit victims before they speak.” LEIGH GILMORE, TAINTED 
WITNESS: WHY WE DOUBT WHAT WOMEN SAY ABOUT THEIR LIVES 140 (2017); 
see also Sherry F. Colb, The Difference Between Presuming Innocence and Pre-
suming Victim Perjury in Acquaintance Rape Trials, DORF ON LAW (July 16, 
2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/07/the-difference-between-presum-
ing.html [hereinafter Colb, The Difference Between] (explaining how “[c]enturies 
of misogyny have . . . presume[ed] that a woman who claims to have been raped 
is an insane perjurer”). 
 55 See supra Part I. 
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fulness in order to further a sexist narrative that women are not cred-
ible and SGBV victims’ accounts are implausible.56 These attorneys 
take advantage of the cultural discounting of victims and the often-
misunderstood or unknown processes through which victims relate 
their accounts of abuse.57 By discrediting victims, defense lawyers 
benefit from adjudicators’ integrative processing.58 When jurors are 
unable to reconcile a victim’s actual behavior with imaginary or cul-
tural narratives about SGBV crimes59 and how a victim “should” act 
or look,60 jurors may be more likely to conclude that the SGBV ac-
counts are false.61 
As it was shown in Jennifer’s account,62 this sexist defense strat-
egy resonates well with adjudicators by hindering convictions and 
deterring victims from coming forward.63 For this reason, defense 
attorneys impeach the credibility of SGBV victims with evidence of 
character for untruthfulness.64 Plaintiff’s attorneys in high profile 
                                                                                                             
 56 See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6; Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. 
 57 See Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1111 (explaining the process of re-
canting and how it does not mean that the victim is lying); Scheppele, supra note 
21, at 138–40 (explaining customary behavior from SGBV victims such as delay 
in reporting, revised stories, and taking the blame). 
 58 Integrative processing refers to the phenomenon that “people make con-
nections between various pieces of information and base decisions on overall im-
pressions rather than on specific pieces of information.” Christina A. Studebaker 
& Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity and Its Influence on Juror Decision Mak-
ing, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 254, 257 (Neil 
Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005); see also Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. 
Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Sub-
stantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1046, 1050 (1997) (showing that jurors adjust the exclusion of evidence to 
their preexisting beliefs lessening the effects of a limiting instruction). 
 59 See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 19–21. 
 60 Rose Corrigan & Corey S. Shdaimah, People with Secrets: Contesting, 
Constructing, and Resisting Women’s Claims About Sexualized Victimization, 65 
CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 436–46 (2016) (discussing Nils Christie’s theory of the 
ideal victim as applied to SGBV victims). 
 61 See Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Vio-
lence Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (2000). 
 62 See supra Part I. 
 63 See infra Part III. For an analysis on how and why these strategies work, 
see TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 44–57 (discussing the rape cases of Mike Tyson 
and Glen Ridge). 
 64 See Méndez, V. Witness, supra note 38, at 465. 
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accusations, such as Britney Taylor’s,65 are also aware of this strat-
egy, and try to counteract it by preemptively rehabilitating their cli-
ent’s credibility.66 
Although research in this area is scarce,67 analyses exist of well-
publicized SGBV cases in and outside the courtroom, including Pro-
fessor Anita Hill’s,68 Nafisatou Diallo’s,69 Katelyn Faber’s,70 and 
Doctor Christine Blasey Ford’s.71 There are also news reports on 
less-publicized trials, such as Liza Yajaira’s,72 and court opinions 
that recount the defense strategies used by attorneys in these types 
of cases.73 Additionally, some scholars have conducted targeted 
                                                                                                             
 65 In September 2019, Britney Taylor accused NFL player Antonio Brown of 
sexually assaulting her. Patrik Walker et al., Antonio Brown Cut by Patriots: 
Timeline of How He Wore Out His Welcome in Pittsburgh, Oakland, New Eng-
land and What’s Next, CBS SPORTS, https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/anto-
nio-brown-cut-by-patriots-timeline-of-how-he-wore-out-his-welcome-in-pitts-
burgh-oakland-new-england-and-whats-next/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2019). Not 
long after Taylor went public with her allegations, another accuser, who remains 
anonymous came forward accusing Antonio Brown of sexually assaulting her. 
Mike Reiss, Brown Out: Pats Cut WR Amid Off-Field Allegations, ESPN (Sept. 
19, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/27662788/brown-pats-
cut-wr-amid-field-allegations. 
 66 Antonio Brown Rape Accuser Claims She Passed Lie Detector, TMZ 
SPORTS (Sept. 11, 2019 6:20 AM), https://www.tmz.com/2019/09/11/antonio-
brown-rape-accuser-claims-she-passed-lie-detector/. 
 67 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 510–11. 
 68 See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 128–45; GILMORE, supra note 54, at 27–
58. 
 69 See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 135–45. 
 70 See JOHN F. WUKOVITS, KOBE BRYANT 58–62 (2011); Renae Franiuk et 
al., Prevalence of Rape Myths in Headlines and Their Effects on Attitudes Toward 
Rape, 58 SEX ROLES 790, 790–800 (2008); Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield 
Laws, supra note 26, at 14–19. 
 71 See Kate Shaw, How Strong Does the Evidence Against Kavanaugh Need 
to Be?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opin-
ion/kavanaugh-blasey-allegation-disqualify.html; Mimi Rocah et al., Brett Ka-
vanaugh Allegations: Why They Are Not Simply A ‘He Said, She Said’ Situation, 
NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opin-
ion/allegations-against-brett-kavanaugh-are-not-simply-he-said-shencna910771. 
 72 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 73 See, e.g., Halstead v. Texas, 891 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
(cross-examination of victim raised issue of whether she had a history of making 
false accusations of sexual misconduct against men she did not like); New Jersey 
v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (victim’s conduct 
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studies of the defenses used by attorneys in certain types of SGBV 
cases.74 
While sources suggest that defense themes in SGBV cases are 
not necessarily different from other cases,75 they show an interesting 
way in which defenses are assembled and how often they are em-
ployed.76 For instance, one study found that in domestic violence 
cases, the most common defenses are self-defense or provocation, a 
lesser charge, diminished capacity, and innocence.77 The defense of 
innocence was reported to be used 37.5% of the time, while self-
defense, diminished capacity, or a lesser charge were used 15%, 
25%, and 22.5%, respectively.78 
Remarkably, attorneys apparently feel quite confident about 
their chances of prevailing by denying their clients committed the 
actions charged, despite the State’s evidence to the contrary.79 In 
contrast, defenses that would admit some lesser type of wrongdoing 
and which do not require negating all of the allegations are less fre-
quently used.80 One possible explanation is that denying all allega-
tions is somewhat easier in SGBV cases because these cases are ul-
timately credibility contests.81 
If two people are equally believable, completely contradicting 
one party’s account of the facts, arguably, does not seem to be the 
best strategy because it automatically implies that someone is lying. 
However, that does not seem to worry defense attorneys in SGBV 
                                                                                                             
of staying with her abuser makes it appear that she is lying about the attack); Wis-
consin v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Wis. 1988) (defense cross-examined sev-
eral witnesses to establish that the victim’s delay in reporting the assault and deny-
ing the incident to family members supports the theory of fabrication); Washing-
ton v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Wash. 1988) (defense implied to jury that 
behavior of battered woman indicated that she lied about attack). 
 74 See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 21, at 537. 
 75 See id. at 513. 
 76 See id. at 522–34. 
 77 Id. at 518. Having an alibi does not seem to be a defense used in these types 
of cases even though it would negate the charges. Cf. id. However, because the 
aggression in these types of cases happen in private spaces between people with 
close relationships, presumptively, the easiest defense to negate the charges is to 
argue that the victim is lying. See id. at 535–36. 
 78 Id. This does not seem to be different from defenses in rape cases. See, e.g., 
TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 47, 55. 
 79 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 518. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Id. at 534. 
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cases.82 Perhaps the reason why attorneys prefer the innocence path 
is that they know that SGBV victims’ testimony could be easily dis-
counted.83 Defense attorneys can easily impeach the victims’ ver-
sions of the events because triers of fact tend to believe victims less 
than defendants.84 In other words, they know that the victim’s per-
ceived lack of credibility provides their best defense. 
Recently, we witnessed a great display of this strategy in the 
nomination hearings of Justice Brett Kavanaugh.85 The White 
House gave a spin to negating Dr. Blasey Ford’s accusations by stat-
ing that they had no doubt that something terrible happened to her 
but that she was confused about who her aggressor was.86 In other 
words, she remembered the assault but not who the aggressor was 
and therefore she was lying about Kavanaugh sexually assaulting 
her. 
In fact, Hartley’s study shows that some of the strategies or im-
peachment techniques used to mount these defenses depend on the 
theory that the victim is lying.87 Depending on the defense, the most 
frequent strategies used include no witnesses, general victim’s char-
acter assassination, highlighting that the accused never threatened 
the victim, and turning victim’s behavior against her.88 Another the-
ory frequently employed is that the relationship was fine and the ac-
cused was remorseful after the offense.89 These defense narratives 
are used to establish the victim’s propensity to lie, a lack of evidence 
of defendant’s prior abusive behavior, or a lack of corroborative tes-
timony.90 Professor Andrew Taslitz made a similar observation 
when he highlighted that, in cases of rape, the cultural story of the 
                                                                                                             
 82 See id. at 518. 
 83 See id. at 530–34. 
 84 See Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, at 44. 
 85 See Kellyanne Conway: Christine Blasey Ford “Absolutely Was Wronged 
by Somebody,” CBS NEWS (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/kellyanne-conway-christine-blasey-ford-abso-
lutely-was-wronged-by-somebody/ (Kellyanne Conway discussing Dr. Christine 
Blasey Ford’s testimony at 4:10–5:30). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 534 (“These tactics range from outright 
denying the abuse (it didn’t happen, she’s lying) to minimizing the abuse (I never 
punched her, I just slapped her) . . . .”). 
 88 Id. at 533. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 534–37. 
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lying woman helps to craft a portrait “of the vengeful, spurned 
woman, lying on the stand to reap her retribution.”91 When these 
defensive narratives are combined with the reality that the offenses 
often take place without witnesses,92 the prevalence of revised ac-
counts,93 and the phenomenon of testimonial injustice,94 defense at-
torneys have a reliable foundation from which to argue that the of-
fense never occurred. 
Testimonial injustice ensues when “the prejudice results in the 
speaker’s receiving more credibility than she otherwise would 
have—a credibility excess—or it results in her receiving less credi-
bility than she otherwise would have—a credibility deficit.”95 In the 
context of SGBV victims, the credibility deficit is caused by the nar-
rative of women as tainted witnesses96 and the narrative of implau-
sibility associated with the “he said/she said” credibility bias.97 As 
Professor Tuerkheimer observes, credibility has two components: 
(1) the trustworthiness of the witness; and (2) the plausibility of the 
testimony.98 In the case of SGBV victims both components are af-
                                                                                                             
 91 See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 18. 
 92 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 535–36. 
 93 See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40. The term revised accounts refers 
to stories that are altered over time, often because victims repress what happened 
to them, hope the abuse will go away, and cover up for their abusers. Id. Revised 
accounts can also be attributed to the physical and psychological harms caused by 
the abuse. Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Credibility: Doubt-
ing the Testimony and Dismissing the Experiences of Domestic Violence Survi-
vors and Other Women, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 449–51 (2019). 
 94 MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF 
KNOWING 17 (2007). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 21. 
 97 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. As a corollary to this credibility deficit, 
SGBV defendants experience a net credibility excess—they benefit from a surplus 
caused by the victims’ credibility deficit. See Schafran, supra note 21, at 42 (“As 
a group [women] are perceived as less competent than men; the context of the 
harms we seek redress in courts is often completely foreign to the trier of fact; and 
even when the harm is acknowledged, it is often minimized by a de minimis pun-
ishment for those who injure us.”). 
 98 Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 13 (citing Karen Jones, The Politics of 
Credibility, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND 
OBJECTIVITY 154, 155 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte E. Witt eds., 2d ed. 2002) 
(adopting Lockean terminology of credibility)). 
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fected. Firstly, women are perceived as less trustworthy, and there-
fore less credible than men.99 Secondly, SGBV accounts are per-
ceived as implausible because of biases against victims and frequent 
misunderstandings of victims’ conduct.100 
A.  Women’s Lack of Trustworthiness 
The ways in which women are frequently turned into tainted or 
less credible witnesses have been well documented.101 Schafran, for 
instance, suggested in her analysis of intimate partner violence that 
this perception is triggered by three credibility biases: (1) collective 
credibility; (2) consequential credibility; and (3) contextual credibil-
ity.102 The first two biases are related to the first component of cred-
ibility—the trustworthiness of the witness.103 
1. COLLECTIVE CREDIBILITY BIAS 
The lack of collective credibility points to a history in which our 
culture has deemed women less credible as a group.104 Simply being 
female brands a victim as untruthful or untrustworthy.105 This is true 
not only for victims, but for women involved in the judicial process 
in any capacity.106 Jurors (1) find female witnesses to be slightly less 
                                                                                                             
 99 See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 18. 
 100 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 101 See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 54, at 138–39; Franiuk et al., supra note 70, 
at 795. 
 102 Schafran, supra note 21, at 5. Other authors have pointed to these phenom-
ena, albeit having labeled the three differently. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 54, 
at 18. For example, Gilmore wrote that “[w]omen are often seen as unpersuasive 
witnesses for three related reasons: because they are women, because through tes-
timony they seek to bear witness to inconvenient truths, and because they possess 
less symbolic and material capital than men as witnesses in courts of law.” Id. 
 103 See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 18. 
 104 Id.; see Schafran, supra note 21, at 5 (“Yet for women, achieving credibil-
ity in and out of the courtroom is no easy task.”). 
 105 Schafran, supra note 21, at 5 (“[S]ocial science and legal research reveal 
that women are still perceived as less credible than men.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Nicole D. Galli & Marta L. Villarraga, Does Your Expert’s Gen-
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credible and persuasive than men;107 (2) are less likely to credit wit-
nesses who use voice patterns regularly associated with women;108 
and (3) perceive female attorneys as “shrill, irrational, and unpleas-
ant” for expressing the same emotions that, when expressed by male 
attorneys, are interpreted as appropriate.109 
This lack of credibility is based solely on the identity of women 
as women.110 However, its roots are shared with the credibility dis-
counts other groups experience.111 As Miranda Fricker has pointed 
out, “[m]any of the stereotypes of historically powerless groups such 
as women, black people, or working-class people variously involve 
an association with some attribute inversely related to competence 
or sincerity or both.”112 
However, credibility is not only discounted in cases in which 
parties are of the opposite sex.113 This phenomenon is a function of 
how witnesses are gendered.114 
For example, in a study about lesbian intimate partner violence, 
researchers found that when participants read a defendant and a vic-
tim as masculine, they viewed the victim as more credible than vic-
tims read as feminine.115 Similarly, when participants believed that 
a defendant and a victim both had traditionally-masculine traits, the 
participants also assessed higher levels of defendant’s responsibil-
ity.116 Conversely, “when the victim was [perceived as] feminine, 
the defendant’s appearance did not impact ratings of defendant re-
sponsibility.”117 Also, participants had more sympathy for victims 
                                                                                                             
 107 Id. 
 108 See Ken Broda-Bahm, Avoid Rising Intonation?, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR 
(May 26, 2014), https://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2014/05/avoid-rising-into-
nation.html (summarizing studies finding that rising intonation or upspeak nega-
tively impact perceptions of credibility). 
 109 Lara Bazelon, What It Takes to be a Trial Lawyer if You’re Not a Man, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09 
/female-lawyers-sexism-courtroom/565778/. 
 110 Schafran, supra note 21, at 5. 
 111 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 42–44. 
 112 FRICKER, supra note 94, at 32. 
 113 See, e.g., Wasarhaley et al., supra note 2, at 651–53. 
 114 See id. This bias, like any of the biases that are discussed throughout, is not 
held only by men. See id. at 647–48. 
 115 Id. at 648. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
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seen as masculine.118 In sum, the study found that exhibiting mas-
culine traits leads to higher believability and in turn a higher likeli-
hood of attributing guilt to a charged abuser.119 These results came 
as a surprise to the researchers that expected more pro-victim ratings 
when the defendant exhibited masculine traits.120 However, when 
we account for the lack of collective credibility of women or victims 
with feminine traits, the results are expected and coherent. 
Overcoming this type of trustworthiness-bias based on a wit-
ness’s gender is very difficult. “Negative identity prejudice, as 
Fricker calls it, is especially concerning because it tends to be ‘re-
sistant to counter-evidence.”‘121 In addition, as Professor Capers has 
observed, this bias is a type of evidence that is put before the jury 
without any check, as it is part of the functional evidence that the 
FRE do not regulate.122 However, we cannot pinpoint the particular 
conduct from an attorney or witness that would make such evidence 
apparent.123 
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 119 Id. at 648, 651. 
 120 Id. at 647–48. 
 121 Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 43 (quoting FRICKER, supra note 94, at 35). 
 122 Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 871, 895. 
 123 Perhaps the best way to counter this bias is through implicit bias training. 
However, the effectiveness of implicit bias training has been questioned. See 
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN 
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 152 (2013); Frank Kineavy, Implicit Bias Training for 
Police Gaining Attention, DIVERSITYINC (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.diver-
sityinc.com/news/implicit-bias-training-police-gaining-attention (stating that “it 
is undetermined whether implicit bias training is effective”); Destiny Peery, Opin-
ion, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help, but It’s Not Enough, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:29 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/destiny-peery/implicit-bias-training-fo_b_9464564.html (stating 
that there is little evidence that implicit bias trainings alone will have a positive 
effect on racial bias in policing and may, in fact, lead to negative backlash). See 
Jason A. Cantone, Federal and State Court Cooperation: Effectiveness of Implicit 
Bias Trainings, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/337738/effective-
ness-implicit-bias-trainings (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining discussions 
held with judges in an effort to combat implicit bias). If implicit bias training is a 
solution, it would be more easily implemented for judges and attorneys who the 
state can require to be continuously trained well in advanced of a trial. See Anita 
Chabria, California May Soon Push Doctors and Lawyers to Confront Their Bi-
ases, L.A. TIMES (September 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/califor-
nia/story/2019-09-12/california-implicit-bias-legislation-doctors-lawyers. Train-
ing jurors would unduly extend the trial or be ineffective as it would be done 
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Victims are well aware that this bias exists.124 For example, in 
Time’s article titled Time 2017 Person of the Year: The Silence 
Breakers, one of the victims interviewed stated that “[she] stayed 
anonymous because [she] live[s] in a very small community. And 
they just think usually that [the women are] lying and complain-
ers.”125 As seen in Jennifer’s case, victims are deterred from coming 
forward even under the guise of anonymity.126 Furthermore, as dis-
cussed infra Part III, pervasive biases hinder convictions and favor-
able adjudications for victims in SGBV cases. 
2. CONSEQUENTIAL CREDIBILITY BIAS 
Consequential credibility bias, another bias Schafran proposes 
that is rooted in women’s identities, also affects convictions and fa-
vorable adjudications.127 Schafran argues that women are afforded 
less consequential credibility, meaning they are part of a group 
whose injuries and harms are not taken seriously.128 Thus, their 
claims are trivialized and minimized.129 
One way in which the consequential credibility bias manifests is 
in the reluctance to arrest or prosecute abusers.130 Jurors and judges 
treat SGBV cases with the same disdain as police officers and pros-
ecutors,131 suggesting that they think SGBV injuries, cases, and 
                                                                                                             
shortly before the trial. However, for jurors, implicit bias can be address through 
jury instructions. See e.g., Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 898–
900. 
 124 See, e.g., Zacharek et al., supra note 6. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See supra Part I. 
 127 Schafran, supra note 21, at 40–41. 
 128 Id.; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28 (“Although false reports of 
rape are uncommon, law enforcement officers often default to incredulity when 
women allege sexual assault, resulting in curtailed investigations and infrequent 
arrests.”). 
 129 See Schafran, supra note 21, at 40–41. 
 130 Hartley, supra note 21, at 512. Part of the reason why police officers do 
not arrest for this type of offense is their skepticism regarding the occurrence of 
SGBV, as they tend to overestimate the incidence of false reporting. See Tuerk-
heimer, supra note 21, at 16.  
 131 See Schafran, supra note 21, at 9, 40; Gender Fairness Implementation 
Comm., Gender Fairness in North Dakota’s Courts: A Ten-Year Assessment, 83 
N.D. L. REV. 309, 337–40 (2007); Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: 
Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 
265–66 (1997); Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, 45–46. 
36 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
abuses are inconsequential. A recent example of this bias was seen 
in the defense of Justice Brett Kavanaugh by two women featured 
during a CNN panel of Republican women from Florida.132 For in-
stance, Gina Sosa stated, “What boy hasn’t done this in high 
school?”133 Similarly, Irina Villarino argued that there was no harm 
because there was no intercourse.134 In short, by exposing their con-
sequential credibility bias, both women underplayed and trivialized 
the harms suffered by victims in situations similar to Dr. Blasey 
Ford.135 
As with the lack of collective credibility, consequential credibil-
ity bias is hard to combat because it is rooted in the identity of the 
victims.136 Like collective credibility bias, SGBV victims are aware 
that consequential credibility bias exists.137 As in Jennifer’s case, 
victims frequently opt not to go to the police or even talk to friends 
and family about the SGBV they suffer.138 For instance, nearly 
twenty percent of non-student female victims of rape or sexual as-
sault of college age, decided not to report because “police would not 
or could not do anything to help.”139 
The preferred strategy to counteract this problem has been train-
ing all actors in the judicial system about the prevalence and im-
portance of prosecuting SGBV cases and about implicit bias.140 
However, the effectiveness of educating members of the judiciary 
                                                                                                             
 132 See CNN, GOP Voter on Kavanaugh: What Boy Hasn’t Done This in High 
School? YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
flIM3AUyQ3A. 
 133 Id. at 1:11–1:14. All the women dismissed her claims as either misremem-
bering, based in jealousy, or overblown. Id. at 2:29–2:42. They also questioned 
her silence and recanting of the story, in addition to victim-blaming Dr. Blasey 
Ford. Id. at 1:26–1:44, 2:29–2:42. All of their comments show how consequential, 
contextual, and collective credibility operate at the same time in SGBV cases. 
 134 Id. at 0:49–1:01. 
 135 See id. at 0:49–1:16. 
 136 See Schafran, supra note 21, at 41. 
 137 See, e.g., SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION 
AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 1, 9 (2014), https://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf. 
 138 See id.; Hartley, supra note 21, at 536. 
 139 SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 137, at 9. 
 140 See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 3, 44 (1999). 
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about the prevalence of SGBV has not really been measured.141 
Moreover, its effectiveness might be diminished when triers of fact 
are faced with impeachments that reinforce collective and contex-
tual biases against a backdrop of a lack of physical evidence.142 
B.  Perceived Implausibility of SGBV Victims’ Testimony 
As anticipated, not only are SGBV victims disbelieved because 
their trustworthiness is discounted,143 but their trustworthiness is 
discounted based on a perceived implausibility.144 This perceived 
implausibility stems from a failure of understanding victims’ real-
ity.145 Like the lack of collective and consequential credibility, this 
failure of understanding is the result of centuries of diminished so-
cial power as women have not been able to participate in the con-
struction of the social experience.146 As a result, women’s experi-
ences not shared by the hegemonic group of men “find no meaning-
ful outlet in collective notions of reality.”147 This translates into two 
                                                                                                             
 141 See Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to 
Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1216 
n.220 (2009) (“There is consensus among advocates that training is the most ef-
fective for judges who are receptive to learning about domestic violence; how-
ever, the true effectiveness of judicial training programs has not been measured.”). 
 142 See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 123, at 152. Some researchers, 
however, have pointed out that training jurors about implicit bias at the beginning 
of the trial or jury instructions regarding implicit bias could be effective at pre-
venting jurors from engaging in this type of thinking when adjudicating cases. See 
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 407, 439, 452–53 (2013); Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors’ 
Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE 
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also seems to indicate that over time bias training loses its effectiveness. See supra 
note 123 and accompanying text. 
 143 See Schafran, supra note 21, at 5. 
 144 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 46 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at 
1) (explaining how hermeneutical injustice overlaps with testimonial injustice). 
 145 Id. at 46–48. 
 146 Id. at 46 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at 148). 
 147 Id. at 47–48. 
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phenomena regarding SGBV: (1) society misunderstands the pro-
cesses of SGBV because of an inability to empathize,148 and (2) the 
collective framing of the SGBV and its harms are structurally prej-
udiced with biased labels and stereotypes.149 
1. CONTEXTUAL CREDIBILITY BIAS 
Schafran denominates the first phenomenon as contextual cred-
ibility bias.150 This bias refers to the inability to put oneself in the 
victim’s shoes.151 In other words, triers of fact are unable to under-
stand victims’ experiences because of stereotypes, social narratives 
or scripts, misconceptions about how victims process their trauma, 
and underestimation of the effects of abuse on victims.152 
Some of the representative narratives of this bias identified in 
the literature, and present in Jennifer’s case,153 include the idea that 
the victim is lying when recanting or revising her story; nothing hap-
pened, because if it had the victim would have come forward sooner; 
the abuser is not the type of person who would commit such an act; 
and questioning why would the victim put herself in the situation of 
violence.154 President Trump embodied a perfect example of this 
type of credibility bias in a tweet about Dr. Blasey Ford not coming 
forward when the alleged attack first happened: 
I have no doubt that, if the attack on Dr. Ford was as 
bad as she says, charges would have been immedi-
ately filed with local Law Enforcement Authorities 
[sic] by either her or her loving parents. I ask that she 
                                                                                                             
 148 See, e.g., St. Joan, supra note 131, at 290–92 (discussing how cultivating 
a sense of empathy with judges for victims will help to lessen cultural myths about 
SGBV victims). 
 149 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 47 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at 
155) (explaining the hermeneutical marginalization of women’s experiences). 
 150 Schafran, supra note 21, at 6. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. at 6; see also Hartley, supra note 21, at 512, 539; Mary Dodge & 
Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Conceptions of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE & 
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 153 See supra Part I. 
 154 See Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 790–91. 
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bring those filings forward so that we can learn date, 
time, and place!155 
Scholars argue that these narratives are in place to protect us 
from uncomfortable truths and to let us think that we might have 
control over these events and might even be able to prevent them.156 
In other words, we believe these narratives because it allows us to 
assume that such an aggression will not happen to us. However, the 
endorsement of these narratives has the effect of diminishing sym-
pathy towards victims.157 
This self-preservation strategy causes us to disparage and ques-
tion the victim more if her case does not fit into some of the stereo-
typical narratives.158 For instance, one of the most prevalent stereo-
typical scripts in cases of rape or sexual violence is that the perpe-
trator is a stranger.159 If the victim was abused by someone close to 
her, one tends to question more whether she is actually telling the 
truth. 160 
Another negative effect of this aspect of contextual credibility is 
that stereotypes and narratives are reinforced by popular culture.161 
For example, in studies performed about the Kobe Bryant rape case, 
researchers found that 
65% of newspapers articles perpetuated at least one 
myth about sexual assault, with “she’s lying” being 
the myth most commonly perpetuated. Further, par-
ticipants in this study who were exposed to a rape 
myth-supporting article were less likely to think Bry-
ant was guilty (before the case went to trial) and more 
                                                                                                             
 155 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:14 
AM), https://twitter.com/ 
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 156 Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 791. 
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likely to think the victim was lying than those ex-
posed to a rape myth-attenuating article.162 
This type of reinforcement is also present in television and cin-
ema.163 
The danger of these myths in the media is that they mislead and 
encourage people to distrust the victim, even when examining the 
evidence might counter misconceptions.164 In addition, these myths 
provide a fertile substratum for future triers of fact and attorneys to 
explain the SGBV with which they come across in court.165 For in-
stance, Pennington and Hastie found that jurors will consider exter-
nal information as part of their thought processes to determine the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant.166 Basically, triers of fact will “fill 
in the blanks” in the cases with their preconceived notions or previ-
ous knowledge about the dynamics of SGBV.167 Thus, these studies 
explain why the impeachment of victims’ credibility is so common-
place and successful. 
Attorneys, as part of society, are susceptible to believing these 
stereotypes about victims in SGBV cases.168 That is why attorneys 
use them as a bridge to communicate with triers of fact. Driven by 
these stereotypes, attorneys and triers of fact instinctively question 
victims and find material to support their distrust.169 
As Hartley points out, 
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if jurors accept the commonly held myths about do-
mestic violence [or any other type of SGBV] and the 
defense further reinforces these misconceptions at 
trial, they may “fill in the blanks” with an unrealistic 
view of the violent relationship, and their evaluation 
of the evidence may be based on misconceptions and 
prejudices unsupported by scientific research.170 
For example, in Jennifer’s case,171 jurors will fill in the blanks 
as to why she did not speak of the rape before, why Mark was able 
to come into her house even when they were separated, why she took 
a pregnancy test, or why she said to the police that she has not been 
a victim of domestic violence.172 They would likely assume that she 
was heartbroken and lying, trying to get back at Mark for leaving by 
having sex with other men clandestinely. The defense attorney just 
needs to ask the questions that will open the door to stereotypes that 
undermine the victim’s credibility.173 
Consequently, the balance in these credibility contests is re-
solved in favor of the defendants, especially when defense counsel 
highlights a lack of corroborative testimony or evidence.174 Recall 
the common impeachment strategies used to undermine the victim’s 
credibility,175 such as pointing out that there are no witnesses be-
sides the parties and eliciting that the defendant never threatened the 
victim.176 As Scheppele has pointed out, 
[c]ases of sexualized violence [or SGBV] often 
evolve into a “he said, she said” battle of competing 
narratives in which the “he,” who is the defendant, 
wins by default simply because the evidence is con-
tested. Default rules about the burden of proof and 
the benefit of the doubt resolve all divergent accounts 
                                                                                                             
 170 Id. 
 171 See supra Part I. 
 172 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 539 (explaining how jurors fill in the blanks 
with own life experiences). 
 173 See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465. 
 174 See, e.g., Crooms, supra note 2, at 471. 
 175 See Hartley, supra note 21, at 522–34. 
 176 Id. at 535–36. 
42 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
in favor of the accused when there are merely con-
tested stories with no “hard” evidence to compel 
choice between them. Though laws on the books 
look more woman-friendly on issues of sexualized 
violence than they used to, women do not always find 
that helpful laws produce victories for women.177 
Moreover, common stereotypes connected to victims are rein-
forced by the lack of understanding triers of fact hold about the dy-
namics of SGBV.178 Specifically, one of the most damaging of those 
stereotypes is that victims who change their stories are liars.179 How-
ever, the most misunderstood characteristic of domestic violence 
victims is that such victims have a tendency to tell revised stories of 
their abuse.180 It has been reported that women tend to move from 
less stereotyped, general, emotionless accounts of their abuse to 
more detailed, compelling, and specific narratives.181 In fact, one 
sign of recovery is that women’s stories of abuse change in this way 
as they recover their sense of safety and make coherent their mem-
ories of abuse.182 However, this sign of recovery from the abuse is 
turned against victims, as in Jennifer’s case, to become the very 
thing that discredits the victims as liars.183 
Similarly, victims’ previous silence about the abuse, victims’ 
history of no reporting, and the fact that victims depict their rela-
tionships as happy and normal are all processes that are used against 
the victims to undermine their credibility,184 as the defense attorney 
did in Jennifer’s case.185 However, these actions are normal pro-
cesses of SGBV victims while they come to terms with the fact that 
they have been victims of SGBV and recover from the traumatic 
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events.186 Yet, these actions are viewed in conjunction with a dis-
credited character to show that the abuse never happened.187 As 
Scheppele so poignantly summarizes, 
[w]omen who delay in telling their stories of abuse 
at the hands of men or who appear to change their 
stories over time about such abuse are particularly 
likely to be discredited as liars. The very fact of delay 
or change is used as evidence that the delayed or 
changed stories cannot possibly be true. But abused 
women frequently have exactly this response: they 
repress what happened; they cannot speak; they hes-
itate, waver, and procrastinate; they hope the abuse 
will go away; they cover up for their abusers; they 
try harder to be “good girls”; and they take the blame 
for the abuse upon themselves. Such actions produce 
delayed or altered stories over time, which are then 
disbelieved for the very reason that they have been 
revised.188 
Consequently, women not only face the disbelief of those closest 
to them, who generally hold the contextual credibility bias and are 
unable to understand why victims stay with their abusive partners,189 
but they also bear the cross of being depicted as less credible in court 
when they seek to redress the wrongs committed against them. The 
law facilitates discrediting these women by allowing the introduc-
tion of character for untruthfulness evidence that reinforces credi-
bility biases.190 
The resulting credibility discount, contrary to the purposes of 
evidentiary rules,191 leads to unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
and misleading jurors and judges in their fact-finding function.192 
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Even though some confusion and prejudice could be countered 
through expert testimony, corroborating evidence, similar accounts 
from other victims, jury instructions, and rehabilitative testimony, it 
is more difficult in practice to fight against the credibility discount. 
Although expert testimony helps explain the inconsistent victim 
behavior,193 it is expensive and time consuming,194 and thus not al-
ways accessible to the parties.195 Also, attorneys may strategically 
choose not to use expert testimony at trial to keep it shorter for both 
the victims’ and jurors’ sake.196 
Similarly, jury instructions directing jurors to properly weigh the 
credibility impeachment by explaining that not believing part of a 
witness’s testimony does not mean that they cannot believe the rest 
of a testimony might not be effective.197 
Furthermore, because of the cycle of violence or the past silence 
from the victim, as in Jennifer’s case, physical corroborative evi-
dence might not be available.198 But even when it is available, cred-
ibility biases might diminish its value. Once a victim is impeached 
as not credible, the impeachment spreads to the evidence associated 
with her.199 The same holds true to other witnesses, who are usually 
related to the victim, that become tainted by association.200 
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In terms of other victims coming forward, that strategy also re-
quires considerable efforts, as plaintiffs will need to devote re-
sources to finding victims and convincing them to participate in the 
action even when they might have decided not to bring actions in 
their own names.201 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis202 might have eliminated this option 
for some victims as arbitration agreements requiring individualized 
proceedings are legal and might become the norm.203 
Finally, rehabilitative testimony might not be effective because 
the victim’s testimony might be compromised by the biases associ-
ated with trustworthiness. The factfinders’ integrative process might 
have led them to already come up with explanations as to why the 
victim is allegedly lying and reaffirm that the victim should not be 
believed. Thus, countering the consequential bias with the victim 
herself could be even more damaging. 
2. “HE SAID/SHE SAID” CREDIBILITY BIAS 
The effectiveness and pervasiveness of consequential credibility 
bias and the resulting credibility discounting is due to the history of 
the prejudiced collective framing of SGBV.204 As Professor Julia 
Simon-Kerr has pointed out, the script of a truthful woman was 
fraught with ideas about her sexual purity—equating unchastity with 
untruthfulness.205 The idea of a woman’s veracity entered early im-
peachment practice and jurisprudence involving women.206 How-
ever, states ultimately barred this type of impeachment in cases 
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other than rape.207 The decision to remove it from cases other than 
SGBV cases signals how SGBV cases were, and still are, socially 
perceived as different from others. 
This differential treatment of unchastity, as applied to women, 
helped create the social script that we as a society must be careful in 
SGBV cases of convicting male defendants because they can be the 
victims of women’s proclivity to lie.208 Such a script, in turn, was 
embodied in the law with requirements of corroboration testimony, 
prompt outcry, and cautionary jury instructions, as well as the avail-
ability of victims’ prior sexual history as impeachment and social 
companion defenses.209 However, these stereotypes and prejudices 
against female victims are not issues of the past and still linger in 
our impeachment practices. For example, jurisdictions that have 
abolished the use of specific acts of untruthfulness to impeach a wit-
ness’s credible character have carved out exceptions for rape cases 
to use this type of evidence because of the particular nature of SGBV 
cases.210 
The persistence of carving out SGBV cases as ones in which we 
must exercise caution with victims because they tend to lie is a direct 
result of the cultural endurance of the description of SGBV cases as 
“swearing contests,” “nobody really knows what happened,” or “he 
said/she said” cases.211 Professor Taslitz, who labels these phenom-
ena as themes, pointed out that the four most common in rape cases 
were silenced voices, bullying, black beasts, and a little more than 
persuading.212 This Article adopts the term “he said/she said” cred-
ibility bias to denominate the collective framing discounting of 
SGBV victims and all its prejudiced and biased societal narratives. 
Behind these neutral descriptions of SGBV cases lies the pre-
sumption that victims are lying about what happened to them.213 
This perceived implausibility about SGBV victims’ testimony is 
built into the fabric of how we talk about these cases.214 
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Two of the stickiest judgments that circulate in re-
sponse to claims by women of sexual violence are 
“he said/she said” and “nobody really knows what 
happened.” . . . They render as unknowable and un-
decidable both physical evidence and verbal testi-
mony. They deflect a more rigorous engagement 
with narratives, persons, evidence, and scenes of 
abuse that are complicated. Physical evidence is dis-
counted when, for example, “she said” the sexual 
contact that the evidence confirms was rape, but “he 
says” it was consensual. . . . It represents the intro-
duction of reasonable doubt, the legal standard by 
which rape is judged in criminal court. But we should 
remember also that “he said/she said” simply identi-
fies how witnesses in an adversarial legal structure 
are positioned. How “he said/she said” has come to 
be seen as something other than the prompt from 
which due process begins suggests that women lie 
outside the frame of justice from the beginning.215 
In other words, these formulations that are depicted as neutral 
portrayals of a situation in which we only have as witnesses the par-
ties themselves serve to discredit the victims before they even 
speak.216 “They represent a free-floating form of collective judg-
ment that attaches to testimony in the form of doubt.”217 These for-
mulations, coupled with contextual credibility bias, are why biases 
that discount the trustworthiness of women are exacerbated in cases 
of SGBV.218 They are also the reason why the use of character for 
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untruthfulness evidence in the impeachment of SGBV victims has 
undue prejudicial effects as opposed to in other contexts.219 
As Professor Colb points out, these prejudiced scripts have con-
sequences on the treatment of witnesses in SGBV cases, their cred-
ibility, and the perception of jurors regarding the issues being 
tried.220 Colb, reflecting on acquaintance rape vis-à-vis robbery, 
states the following: 
Some folks, however, make the mistake of thinking 
that in order to presume innocence, we must con-
clude that the complaining witness in a rape case, the 
alleged rape victim, is perjuring herself when she 
provides incriminating testimony against the accused 
rapist. They compound this mistake by imagining 
that we must give as much credence to the defendant 
as we do to the alleged victim and that we cannot 
convict a rapist on the basis of the victim’s testimony 
alone. 
None of that is true. Think about a non-rape case, an 
armed robbery. Juries must presume that the defend-
ant is innocent there as well, and the prosecution 
there must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to 
avoid an acquittal too. Yet no one presumes that the 
robbery victim, as he testifies, is lying on the stand. I 
know, because I was a robbery victim, and the de-
fense attorney bent over backwards to treat me with 
respect and to make clear that he thought I might 
have been mistaken but not that I might have been 
lying. He is not an outlier. Juries would hate a de-
fense attorney who approached a crime victim wit-
ness as one would approach a liar, unless, that is, the 
victim accuses the defendant of acquaintance rape.221 
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As noted, the interaction between the neutral rules of allowing 
character for untruthfulness evidence magnifies the credibility bi-
ases discussed. The underlying bias tends to confuse the issues for 
triers of fact whose views are already skewed against SGBV victims 
because of their gender identity.222 In turn, the inherent biases in the 
rules aid attorneys in achieving not guilty verdicts by creating nar-
ratives about the defendant’s innocence, victim’s tendency to lie, 
and victim’s revengeful prosecutions. In Jennifer’s case, for exam-
ple, these narratives imbedded in the functional evidence were the 
bedrock from which the defense attorney’s cross and closing drew 
support.223 
Moreover, this credibility discounting through perceived im-
plausibility also deters victims from coming forward.224 In fact, con-
viction rates seem to suggest that when attorneys employ these strat-
egies, they are quite effective.225 
III.  #TIMESUP: THE COSTS OF CHARACTER FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
EVIDENCE IN SGBV CASES 
When I testified, I had already had to watch this man’s attorney 
bully, badger and harass my team, including my mother . . . I was 
angry.226 
 
SGBV remains an alarming problem. Most of these crimes are 
not prosecuted, mainly because they go unreported.227 Organiza-
tions working in the field estimate that less than twenty-five percent 
of all sexual assaults,228 a third of all rapes,229 and around forty per-
cent of all stalking crimes are in fact reported.230 Moreover, meta-
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analysis of police and judicial statistics reveals that only one out of 
six domestic violence cases reported to the police in the United 
States results in conviction.231 Furthermore, only one third of the 
people arrested end up convicted.232 “About 0.7% of rapes and at-
tempted rapes end with a felony conviction for the perpetrator, ac-
cording to an estimate based on the best of the imperfect measures 
available.”233 It is also estimated that a robbery accusation is four 
times more likely to end in a conviction.234 
These numbers illustrate a twofold problem. First, a large per-
centage of the victims are not seeking judicial redress.235 Second, 
the ones that do go through the legal process are not receiving the 
justice they deserve.236 
There are multiple reasons attributed to the low reporting rates 
in these types of crimes.237 It has been widely documented that vic-
tims do not feel comfortable going to the authorities because police 
officers do not validate their accusations, and instead they are re-
ceived with a new iteration of the SGBV that they have been trying 
to escape.238 As discussed, victims are received this way due to cred-
ibility discounting.239 In addition, in many instances, women are try-
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ing to avoid the negative effects that prosecuting these abuses pre-
sent in their lives, such as adverse child custody determinations or 
becoming the object of criminal investigations themselves.240 
Another important reason for the low reporting rate is how the 
credibility discounting operates by activating trustworthiness and 
plausibility biases through the impeachment of victims with charac-
ter for untruthfulness evidence.241 Victims are cognizant of that pos-
sibility and, as a result, are deterred from coming forward.242As we 
saw in Jennifer’s case, victims know that they could be doubly vic-
timized during cross-examination.243 They are aware that they 
would have to relive their abusive experiences and subject them-
selves to re-enactments of the abuse and disparagement during the 
trial.244 Moreover, our adversarial system values aggressiveness 
during the trial, particularly during cross-examination.245 
These problems with the adversarial system grow even deeper 
when factors such as race, socio-economic position, and immigra-
tion status are thrown into the mix.246 Not only are they accentuated 
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by extrajudicial factors or functional evidence,247 but the legal sys-
tem is increasing the harshness of cross.248 The holdings in Craw-
ford v. Washington,249 Blakely v. Washington,250 and United States 
v. Booker;251 the erosion of evidentiary privileges for accusers;252 
increasing sentences;253 mandatory prosecutions (no-drop poli-
cies);254 and the legality of arbitration agreements providing for in-
dividualized proceedings255 have made indispensable the testimony 
of the victims during the trial, expanded the scope of issues victims 
must testify about, and strained the relationships between prosecu-
tors and victims.256 This, in turn, has made cross harsher and the 
experience of victims worse.257 
Because of the aforementioned changes, defendants are more 
likely to go to trial and contest their convictions because sentences 
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pra note 241, at 1367–71 (stating how Blakely has expanded proceedings that 
victims would be subjected to). 
 251 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005) (holding “that the Sixth Amendment as con-
strued in Blakely does apply to the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines”); see also 
Lininger, supra note 241, at 1367–69 (explaining how Booker, in conjunction 
with Blakely, has increased the likelihood of trials and therefore the likelihood of 
victims being subject to cross-examinations). 
 252 Lininger, supra note 241, at 1371–74 (explaining how the erosion of 
spousal privilege, self-incrimination, privilege for psychiatric and counseling rec-
ords make victims less likely to wish to testify). 
 253 Id. at 1379–80 (explaining how increased sentences makes trials and cross-
examinations more likely and more aggressive). 
 254 Id. at 1362 (explaining how “‘no drop’ policies in many prosecutors’ of-
fices have added to victims’ sense of frustration during cross-examination”). 
 255 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (holding that the 
Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of agreements that provide for individ-
ualized arbitration). 
 256 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 241, at 1373, 1380, 1392, 1394. 
 257 See id. at 1363, 1373. 
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could be longer, meaning the defendant has more at stake.258 This 
translates to more aggressive cross examinations of victims.259 Fur-
thermore, the relationship between victims and prosecutors has been 
shaken, as the latter are now required to force witnesses to testify 
with low expectations of prevailing or transforming the nature of 
their personal and family relationships with the defendants.260 As a 
result, the tortuous process for the victim is lengthened. 
As discussed, the credibility discounting women face impacts 
conviction rates because credibility biases constrain victims into not 
reporting and drive police officers away from going forward with 
investigations.261 Similarly, based on the convictability standard,262 
prosecutors choose not to pursue cases as they know they will not 
prevail in court because jurors will discount victims’ credibility.263 
These underreporting and low conviction rates are not exclusive 
to criminal proceedings—the same story repeats itself in civil cases 
for sexual harassment.264 For example, it is estimated that seventy-
five percent of people who experience sexual harassment, eighty-
three percent of which are women, do not report it.265 Moreover, in 
the past decade, over half of the sexual harassment claims have re-
sulted in no charge.266 
                                                                                                             
 258 See id. at 1380. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 1362; Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the 
War Against Domestic Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 453 (2015). 
 261 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28–32. 
 262 See id. at 37–38. 
 263 Id. at 36–41; see also Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 
895 (discussing how prosecutors and defense attorneys, when deciding whether 
to enter plea negotiations or proceed with a case, take into account functional ev-
idence, such as gender and the effect of credibility biases, in assessing the strength 
of the evidence). 
 264 See, e.g., Mona Chalabi, Sexual Harassment at Work: More Than Half of 
Claims in US Result in No Charge, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2016, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jul/22/sexual-harassment-at-work-
roger-ailes-fox-news. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 2; see also Chalabi, 
supra note 264. This does not include the approximately twenty-two percent of 
cases that were closed for “administrative reasons” over the last nine years. 
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 2. 
54 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
Credibility discounting helps to explain some of the reasons for 
low conviction rates in SGBV cases, and also gives us an explana-
tion as to why rape shield laws have been unsuccessful in bringing 
reporting and conviction rates up.267 Notwithstanding this reality, 
character for untruthfulness evidence continues to be allowed by the 
FRE in SGBV cases, in spite of data showing that such evidence is 
not a good predictor of whether a witness is lying268 and that false 
accusations in these cases are estimated to be less than ten per-
cent.269 
The #MeToo movement has not only drawn attention to the 
prevalence of SGBV, but also to the discounting of women’s credi-
bility in SGBV cases and its consequences.270 The movement has 
made clear the consequences women endure by coming forward 
about their experiences and how that has caused them to remain si-
lent and not press charges or file lawsuits.271 It has shown us how 
class, race, and nationality affect the outcome in SGBV cases.272 
                                                                                                             
 267 See Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on 
the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 861, 880–82 (1996); Julie Horney & Cassia C. Spohn, Rape Law 
Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
117, 880–82 (1991); Bennett Capers, Rape, Truth, and Hearsay, 40 HARV. J. L. & 
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 268 See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of 
Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 769, 771–72 (2008) (stating 
that “a person’s behavior in a given situation cannot accurately be predicted on 
the basis of personality test scores or even past behavior in a similar situation”). 
 269 Get Statistics, supra note 2 (stating how the prevalence of false reporting 
is between two and ten percent); Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing 
how false report rates fall between 4.5%, 5.9%, and 6.8%). 
 270 See Zacharek et al., supra note 6. 
 271 See id. 
 272 For example, if we consider Taylor Swift’s successful claim, we notice that 
she is white, rich, and filed a lawsuit for the symbolic amount of one dollar. See 
Hillary Weaver, Taylor Swift Has Finally Been Sent the Symbolic Dollar She Won 
in Court, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/style/2017/12/former-dj-david-mueller-says-he-sent-taylor-swift-dol-
lar-payment. We can infer how all these factors played out in her favor by high-
lighting to jurors that she could not have any ulterior motive to bring charges 
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More importantly, it has made evident that it is one thing to publicly 
and temporarily ostracize aggressors and another to secure convic-
tions or judgments against them.273 
Unfortunately, the #MeToo movement has also created a back-
lash in terms of victims’ credibility.274 It has been reported that from 
2017 to 2018 people distrust victims more and think of SGBV as an 
inconvenience rather than a real problem in need of solution: 
The share of American adults responding that men 
who sexually harassed women at work 20 years ago 
should keep their jobs has risen from 28% to 36%. 
The proportion who think that women who complain 
about sexual harassment cause more problems than 
they solve has grown from 29% to 31%. And 18% of 
Americans now think that false accusations of sexual 
assault are a bigger problem than attacks that go un-
reported or unpunished, compared with [a previous] 
13% . . . .275 
Parallel, we have seen an increase of “no cause” determinations 
in sexual harassment cases and the decrease in settlements.276 
                                                                                                             
against her assailant. In fact, most of the women we have seen in the media asso-
ciated with the #MeToo movement have been largely white, non-immigrant, and 
wealthy. See generally Zacharek et al., supra note 6. Meanwhile, we ignore how 
unsuccessful the movement has been for women of color, undocumented, in jobs 
with minimum wage. See Charisse Jones, When Will MeToo Become WeToo? 
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30, 2019, 5:13 PM). 
 273 Since April 2017, of the 263 celebrities, politicians, CEOs, and others who 
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quences for their actions. Anna North et al., A List of People Accused of Sexual 
Harassment, Misconduct, or Assault, VOX, https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-har-
assment-assault-allegations-list (last updated Jan. 9, 2019). This suggests that it is 
easier to publicly condemn these men than to pursue legal action. 
 274 See, e.g., After a Year of #MeToo, American Opinion has Shifted Against 
Victims, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-de-
tail/2018/10/15/after-a-year-of-metoo-american-opinion-has-shifted-against-vic-
tims [hereinafter After a Year of #MeToo]. 
 275 Id. 
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This backlash should serve, however, as an incentive to take ad-
vantage of the rise in awareness brought by the #MeToo move-
ment.277 Otherwise, the #MeToo movement could just become an-
other chapter in the cycle of increased awareness followed by no 
change, just like the movement in the ‘90s.278 
IV.  #NEVERMORE: REFORMING IMPEACHMENT OF SGBV 
VICTIMS’ CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS 
I have lied, but I am not a liar.279 
 
Some commentators have suggested that a way to deal with the 
problems discussed could be to have no juries in SGBV cases.280 
That proposal goes against the core values of our criminal justice 
system,281 and it does not consider that these cases also play out in 
the civil arena282 or that judges might be as ill-equipped to deal with 
the cases as jurors.283 
A more sensible way to address the problems so far discussed 
would be to reform our evidentiary rules to shield victims from at-
tacks about their character for truthfulness that play on patriarchal 
prejudices and discount women’s credibility. In that way, our legal 
system would guarantee a fair redress of the harms inflicted on 
SGBV victims in an environment that would promote awareness and 
                                                                                                             
 277 See, e.g., Theodore L. Caputi et al., Research Letter: Internet Searches for 
Sexual Harassment and Assault, Reporting, and Training Since the #MeToo 
Movement, 179 J. INTERNAL MED. 258, 258–59 (2019). 
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rape, judges and juries, continue to be skeptical . . . .”); see also Last Week To-
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 279 Hearing with Michael Cohen, Former Attorney to President Donald 
Trump: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. 
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 282 See Chalabi, supra note 264. 
 283 See, e.g., Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62. 
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transform our rape and credibility discounting culture, while im-
proving the low victim favorable outcomes in SGBV cases. Adopt-
ing evidentiary rules that would prevent attorneys from impeaching 
victims with evidence of character for untruthfulness could amelio-
rate the revictimization of SGBV victims and foster fairer trials. It 
could also incentivize victims to come forward and change the cul-
ture around SGBV.284 
A.  United States Landscape on the Use of Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence Victims’ Character for Untruthfulness Evidence 
Regulating fairly and effectively the impeachment of the char-
acter for truthfulness of a witness has historically proven to be a 
challenge because, as Michael Cohen so eloquently explained, lying 
does not make one a liar.285 Legal commentators have pointed out 
how the common law rule allowing evidence of the character for 
untruthfulness of a witness should not be allowed as its prejudicial 
effects outweigh any probative value this type of evidence could 
have in any of its forms.286 Research has questioned the common-
sense notion that there is a unified trait for honesty (i.e., a character 
for truthfulness) and has shown the prejudicial effects of this type of 
impeachment in spite of limiting instructions.287 In fact, jurors and 
judges alike tend to overestimate or be over-persuaded by this type 
of evidence, leading them to misinterpret its import.288 
Yet FRE 608 and FRE 609 allow for the admission of this type 
of evidence.289 This disconnect between the strong evidence that 
                                                                                                             
 284 The proposal in this Article is not intended to solve the problem of SGBV, 
nor does it claim that the judicial system is best equipped to do so. Its scope is 
more modest. It aims at removing barriers that hinder victims from redressing the 
harms they have suffered. The essential premise is that, as long as we address the 
problem through legal mechanisms, the redress available to victims should not be 
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 285 Hearing with Michael Cohen, supra note 279, at 15; see also Gold, supra 
note 268, at 771–72. 
 286 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evi-
dence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993) (arguing 
that all forms of character evidence are highly prejudicial in all of the contexts, 
affecting both the judgments of judges and juries alike). 
 287 See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 58, at 265–66. 
 288 Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence, supra note 36, at 
1054. 
 289 See FED. R. EVD. 608, 609. 
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there is no such thing as a character for truthfulness that can be used 
to predict or determine whether a person is lying on a specific occa-
sion290 and our insistence of using past events to ascertain the cred-
ibility of a witness291 helps explain why we have so many issues 
with the impeachment of character for truthfulness in evidentiary 
law.292 Historically, no type of evidence of character for truthfulness 
(i.e., opinion, reputation, conviction, and bad acts) has been ex-
empted from this controversy or admitted consistently in one 
way.293 
1. OPINION & REPUTATION EVIDENCE 
Prior to the enactment of the FRE, evidence about the character 
for untruthfulness of a witness in the form of reputation was once 
considered to be unreliable hearsay.294 This type of evidence, in the 
form of opinion, was excluded under the belief that it “preempt[ed] 
the jury’s function as the final arbiter of fact.”295 
However, today, opinion and reputation evidence are considered 
the most reliable types of evidence regarding a victim’s character 
for truthfulness, and their use is widely accepted because the safe-
guards in place are believed to guarantee the reliability of the gen-
eralizations based on this evidence.296 For instance, evidence in the 
                                                                                                             
 290 See Gold, supra note 268, at 771–72. 
 291 See, e.g., FED. R. EVD. 608, 609. 
 292 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 241, at 1376; Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, 
at 28. Although evidence suggests that character for truthfulness/untruthfulness 
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 293 See, e.g., Charles H. Kanter & Richard Page, Impeaching and Rehabilitat-
ing a Witness with Character Evidence: Reputation, Opinion, Specific Acts and 
Prior Convictions, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 319, 324 (1976); Donald H. Zeigler, Har-
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REV. 635, 646–47 (2003). 
 294 Kanter & Page, supra note 293, at 324. 
 295 Id. at 327. 
 296 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discuss-
ing how the use of character evidence for truthfulness evolved from notions of 
honor and reputation to today’s system; arguing that the current system is still 
premised on notions of status as to who is culturally considered credible and not 
in the seeking of mendacity). 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 59 
form of reputation is based on a pool of people that know and be-
lieve a witness possesses a trait of untruthfulness, so it should be 
more reliable than evidence based on one witness’ opinion.297 Sim-
ilarly, evidence in the form of opinion is based on a larger data clus-
ter as it requires the witness to base it on more than one act of un-
truthfulness.298 Moreover, the basis for a witness’s testimony re-
garding reputation or opinion must be disclosed for the testimony to 
be admissible.299 This ensures the reliability of the evidence. 
In sum, because of these safeguards, the likelihood of this evi-
dence leading to a confusion of the issues is more limited, even in 
SGBV cases (in spite of the credibility biases rooted in patriar-
chy).300 In addition, this type of evidence is not as widely available 
as evidence of specific acts.301 Moreover, it continues to be accepted 
by the majority of jurisdictions in the United States because of its 
apparent reliability302 and the required disclosure of the bases for 
the opinion or reputation.303 Therefore, a proposal to limit its preju-
dicial effects in the context of SGBV cases should be narrow. 
                                                                                                             
 297 Id. at 178–79. 
 298 Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1993), as modified 
on denial of reh’g (Dec. 8, 1993) (“The telling of a lie not only cannot be equated 
to the possession of a reputation for untruthfulness, but does not by itself establish 
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 299 See, e.g., Oregon v. Paniagua, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (af-
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 300 See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465 (“[U]nrestrained use of 
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tive issues to be decided.”); Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 
207 (“This focus on ‘worthiness of belief’ is intertwined with social hierarchies 
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 301 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 156 (“[I]n today’s 
atomistic society, people do not have discernable reputations for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness that can be accurately commented on in court.”). 
 302 Id. at 186 (“Most states have gradually adopted the Federal Rules’ ap-
proach to impeachment.”). 
 303 See, e.g., Oregon v. Paniagua, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (hold-
ing that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding witness’s personal 
opinion about victim’s character for truthfulness to impeach victim’s testimony 
during assault trial when witness met victim four years prior to trial but had only 
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2. PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE 
The same could be said regarding prior convictions. Yet, im-
peachment by prior convictions requires more careful attention. 
Even though prior convictions are a subset of specific acts, they have 
historically been treated differently than prior acts of untruthful-
ness.304 The difference in treatment is due, in part, to the fact that 
impeachment by prior convictions developed as an impeachment 
tool later in time.305 Because being convicted of a crime historically 
made most people incompetent to testify, prior convictions had no 
use as an impeachment tool.306 Once that bar was removed, prior 
convictions became a previous bad act to be used to impeach the 
credibility of a witness.307 However, jurisdictions disagreed as to the 
scope of impeachment based on prior convictions.308 
This disagreement persists today.309 Jurisdictions differ on 
whether only convictions of crimen falsi should be used to impeach, 
whether felonies should be used, how remote a conviction must be 
to be valid for impeachment, whether the impeachment should be 
subject to a prejudicial analysis under FRE 403, and whether the 
conviction must be automatically admitted or the court should have 
discretion on its admissibility.310 
The FRE provide that a prior felony conviction for a witness, 
other than the defendant, must be admitted if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.311 However, in a 
criminal case, a defendant’s prior conviction must be admitted “if 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial ef-
fect.”312 Yet, for crimen falsi, the evidence must be admitted with 
                                                                                                             
seen her five or six times within the last year and indicated she had formed her 
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 304 See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 646–47. 
 305 Id. at 639. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 639–40. 
 308 Id. at 640–41. 
 309 See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 662–66. 
 310 See id. 
 311 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A) (subjecting a felony conviction to the balanc-
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relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair 
prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). 
 312 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). 
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no further analysis.313 Furthermore, there is a ten-year limitation on 
prior convictions evidence; for any older conviction the proponent 
of the evidence must provide written notice to the adverse party and 
prove that the evidence substantially outweighs the prejudicial ef-
fect.314 The ease of admission of these types of character for untruth-
fulness evidence rests on the assumption that the act must be suffi-
ciently extreme to be a crime and that it be an act that was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the witness.315 Therefore, 
the act should provide a reliable basis to judge the character of a 
person.316 
Nonetheless, this type of reliance does not help explain the di-
vergent treatment between bad acts and prior convictions, such as 
the time limitation, the ability of bringing acts not related to honesty, 
the differences on being subject to a balancing test, the balancing 
test used, or the scope of the cross about the evidence.317 In fact, 
scholars have been pushing for the realignment of the rules regard-
ing impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts.318 Some of 
that harmonizing has occurred.319 However, there still exist some 
discrepancies that do not make much sense.320 For instance, attor-
neys are allowed to cross under FRE 608 on events that will not be 
permitted under FRE 609 and get into more detailed information 
about the events that should have less reliance than prior convic-
tions.321 Attorneys can also bring in convictions that have nothing 
to do with truthfulness, but cannot use bad acts that do not involve 
dishonesty.322 
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 314 FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
 315 See Gold, supra note 268, at 775. 
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 317 Compare FED. R. EVID. 608, with FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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 321 See FED R. EVID. 608, 609. 
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Because of the wide acceptance of prior convictions as character 
for untruthfulness evidence and its limited scope on cross-examina-
tion,323 a proposal for reform on the use of prior convictions evi-
dence in the context of SGBV cases that is narrowly tailored to limit 
the prejudicial effects of such evidence is probably more likely to be 
adopted than a total overhaul of this evidentiary method. However, 
the jurisdictional divergence in terms of what type of prior convic-
tions can be used and the standards used for admissibility highlights 
the need for a proposal that considers carefully the crimes covered, 
the balancing test to which prior convictions should be subjected, 
and its scope. 
In addition, because of the lower reliability of this type of evi-
dence vis-à-vis evidence in the form of opinion or reputation,324 this 
type of evidence could lead to confusing issues more easily and 
could be used to play into the biased narratives previously ex-
plained.325 Likewise, this type of evidence deserves more attention 
because evidence in this form could include issues that are not re-
lated to credibility (crimes other than crimen falsi)326 or be about 
crimes not actually committed because of pleading strategies.327 
This evidence could also arise in more cases as it might be more 
readily available than opinion or reputation evidence.328 Thus, its 
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use as a tool to impeach character for truthfulness in SGBV cases 
could have a greater effect. Consequently, the proposal to limit the 
prejudicial effects of character for untruthfulness evidence in the 
form of prior convictions, in the context of SGBV cases, should be 
more comprehensive than the reform of this evidence in the form of 
opinion or reputation. 
3. PRIOR ACTS OF UNTRUTHFULNESS EVIDENCE 
In the case of prior acts of untruthfulness, the reform should be 
even more extensive. As scholars have pointed out, “[o]f the four 
types of witness character evidence, misconduct evidence provides 
the weakest basis for making a generalization about truthfulness.”329 
As discussed, a single act or multiple separate acts do not serve by 
themselves to predict whether a person would lie in a particular con-
text.330 Moreover, specific acts are a type of evidence to which the 
witness might not be prepared to respond and explain because it 
could refer to events that are not memorable.331 However, jurors 
tend to give great weight to evidence of prior bad acts.332 It is for 
this reason that the admissibility of evidence of bad acts has been 
restricted since the Eighteenth Century.333 The main methods em-
ployed to restrict impeachment with bad acts have been (1) a total 
ban on questioning using this type of evidence, and (2) permitting 
questions on the matter during cross-examination, “but without re-
course to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence if the witness denies the 
acts.”334 
As explained, the FRE follow the second method. While FRE 
608(b) allows the impeachment of witnesses with previous acts of 
untruthfulness, FRE 403 provides, in theory, a wall against using 
this evidence to impeach SGBV victims by excluding evidence 
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INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 45–46 
(1980)). 
 333 Kanter, supra note 293, at 328–29. 
 334 Id. at 328. 
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whose probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair preju-
dice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.335 In practice, 
however, even if the effects of impeachment with collateral acts of 
untruthfulness could be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or mislead-
ing to the jury because of the phenomenon of a woman’s lack of 
credibility,336 the evidence is usually admitted because it is seen as 
relevant, and its probative value is not outweighed by the prejudicial 
effects.337 Thus, FRE 403 does not seem to serve as much of a safe-
guard to victims of SGBV. 
Nor does FRE 611. As commentators have argued, even though 
FRE 611 grants the court the faculty to limit the interrogation of a 
witness to protect the witness from harassment or undue embarrass-
ment,338 “the rule does not include any concrete language indicating 
what constitutes ‘harassment or undue embarrassment,’” nor is there 
a solid body of case law expanding on the meaning of those terms.339 
With no definition that would include the interplay of credibility bi-
ases for SGBV victims as embarrassment or harassment beyond 
what a witness would normally endure during cross-examination, 
the rule serves no protection from defense strategies predicated on 
the trustworthiness and plausibility biases.340 Moreover, when an at-
torney uses a recognized impeachment method, courts usually pre-
sume that FRE 611 is not applicable.341 
                                                                                                             
 335 Rule 403 provides the following: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence. 
FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 336 See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 21, at 5. 
 337 A reason for that result is that judges participate also in the trustworthiness 
and plausibility biases that discount victims’ credibility. See Schafran, supra note 
21, at 9, 40; Gender Fairness Implementation Comm., supra note 131, at 337–40; 
St. Joan, supra note 131, at 265–66. 
 338 See FED. R. EVID. 611. 
 339 Lininger, supra note 241, at 1387. 
 340 See supra Part II. 
 341 See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1387 (citing, inter alia, State v. Perolis, 
398 S.E.2d 512, 517 (W. Va. 1990) (“no witness should be protected from the 
embarrassment of proper impeachment”)). 
2019] EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT 65 
In sum, these protections are insufficient for victims of SGBV 
in court and do not facilitate a fair trial in these types of cases. An 
easy solution would be to institute a total ban on impeachment using 
prior acts of untruthfulness. That would not only help in the im-
peachment of SGBV victims but would also address the problems 
in general with this type of evidence.342 However, most states follow 
the federal scheme as pertaining to impeachment of a witness’s cred-
ibility with specific acts.343 Therefore, such a solution does not seem 
like it would have many adherents. 
More importantly, even the states that limit the use of bad acts 
for impeachment purposes do not have a complete ban on this type 
of evidence.344 Out of the nine states that limit evidence of specific 
acts of untruthfulness, eight states have chiseled a judicial exception 
for the introduction of such evidence to impeach victims in cases of 
sex crimes with a prior reporting of sexual misconduct not ending in 
conviction or a false accusation.345 This is irrespective of how the 
states treat other forms of evidence of untruthfulness. For example, 
                                                                                                             
 342 See, e.g., Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 221 (propos-
ing an abolition on the use of reputation, opinion, and prior bad act evidence for 
impeachment purposes). 
 343 Id. at 186. 
 344 See, e.g., LA. CODE EVID. art. 608(B) (“Particular acts, vices, or courses of 
conduct of a witness may not be inquired into or proved by extrinsic evidence for 
the purpose of attacking his character for truthfulness, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Articles 609 and 609.1 or as constitutionally required.”). 
 345 See infra notes 346–53 and accompanying text. 
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Florida,346 Louisiana,347 and Massachusetts,348 which only admit 
evidence of character for truthfulness in the form of reputation and 
                                                                                                             
 346 FLA. STAT. §§ 90.609, 90.610 (2019). Florida courts have carved out ex-
ceptions to the admission of such evidence. See, e.g., Roebuck v. State, 953 So. 
2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing trial court because it did not allow 
the impeachment of the victim with an alleged false reporting incident based on 
section 90.405(2) of the Florida Statutes, which allows proof of specific incidents 
of conduct when offered to prove a particular trait of character; in this case, the 
“trait of character was that the witness may be inclined to lie about sexual inci-
dents and charge people with those acts without justification.”); Blue v. State, 8 
So. 3d 454, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that refusing to allow defend-
ant to question victim about previous statements she had made and that would 
have provided proof that she had made false allegations against the defendant in 
the past, violated defendant’s right to a full cross-examination). 
 347 LA. CODE EVID. art. 608. Like Florida, Louisiana has also carved out ex-
ceptions to the admission of prior allegations. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 743 So. 2d 
199, 203–04 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a defendant may present evidence 
that a victim made prior false allegations regarding sexual activity for impeach-
ment purposes); State v. Freeman, 970 So. 2d 621, 624–26 (La. Ct. App. 2007) 
(conducting a 403 analysis on the introduction of prior accusations and determin-
ing that the probative value of evidence that the victim had made prior accusations 
of kidnapping and rape against a person ultimately acquitted of such charges, was 
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice in subsequent aggravated 
rape prosecution as the prior acquittal did not establish that victim made a false 
accusation, there was no evidence that the victim ever retracted the prior allega-
tion of abuse, and there was no independent witness to testify that the prior alle-
gation was false). 
 348 The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence provides insight into the application 
of the state’s rule on character evidence and provides: 
The Supreme Judicial Court has “chiseled” a narrow exception 
to the rule that the testimony of a witness may not be impeached 
with specific acts of prior misconduct, recognizing that in spe-
cial circumstances (to date, only rape and sexual assault cases) 
the interest of justice would forbid its strict application. Com-
monwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 151–152. In Common-
wealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–96 (1978), the special 
circumstances warranting evidence of the prior accusations 
were that (1) the witness was the victim in the case on trial; (2) 
the victim/witness’s consent was the central issue at trial; (3) 
the victim/witness was the only Commonwealth witness on the 
issue of consent; (4) the victim/witness’s testimony was incon-
sistent and confused; and (5) there was a basis in independent 
third-party records for concluding that the victim/witness’s 
prior accusation of the same type of crime had been made and 
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prior convictions, have recognized an exception in the case of sexual 
crimes. Likewise, Alaska,349 Illinois,350 New Jersey,351 Oregon,352 
and Texas,353 which have a broader recognition of reputation and 
prior conviction evidence, have also recognized such an exception. 
                                                                                                             
was false. Not all of the Bohannon circumstances must be pre-
sent for the exception to apply. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37 
Mass. App. Ct. 332, 337 (1994). 
MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608 note to subsection (b). 
 349 ALASKA R. EVID. 608. Alaska courts have also carved out exceptions for 
prior false accusations. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding that “if the defendant proves that a complaining witness has 
made prior false accusations of sexual assault (under the rules explained in the 
next section of this opinion), the defendant is not limited to cross-examining the 
complaining witness concerning these prior accusations. Rather, the defendant 
can both cross-examine the complaining witness and present extrinsic evidence 
on this point.”). 
 350 ILL. R. EVID. 608. Likewise, Illinois has carved an exception. See, e.g., 
State v. Visgar, 457 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (deciding that daugh-
ter’s prior allegation of sexual misconduct by defendant did not warrant a psychi-
atric examination where defendant had opportunity to attempt to impeach her dur-
ing cross-examination with regard to such allegation); State v. Alexander, 452 
N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that “[t]he trial court did not err in 
ruling that evidence of prior rape complaints by the victim are inadmissible where 
defendant was unable to show that the prior complaints were unfounded”) (em-
phasis added). 
 351 N.J. R. EVID. 608. In addition to Alaska and Illinois, New Jersey has carved 
out exceptions in cases of sexual violence. See, e.g., State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 
308, 324–25 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing in criminal cases an exception to the rule of 
evidence barring the admission of specific instances of conduct to attack a wit-
ness’s character for truthfulness that allow a defendant to introduce evidence that 
the victim has made a prior false criminal accusation when the credibility of the 
victims is the central issue in the case, and where the proof of the false accusation 
is not a diversion so that it would overshadow the trial of the charges itself). New 
Jersey has even included its exception in the text of the rule. See N.J. R. EVID. 
608(b). 
 352 OR. EVID. CODE § 608. Similarly, Oregon has an exception to its rule on 
the use of prior accusations. See, e.g., State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 615 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1986) (concluding that the confrontation clause “requires that the court per-
mit a defendant to cross-examine the complaining witness with other accusations 
she has made if 1) she has recanted them, 2) the accusations were false, or 3) there 
is some evidence that the victim has made prior false accusations that were 
false.”). 
 353 TEX. R. EVID. 608. In addition, Texas has carved an exception for prior 
false accusations. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225–26 (Tex. Crim. 
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The justifications for allowing evidence of prior reporting with-
out a conviction and false accusations to be admitted at trial vary 
from the right to confrontation,354 to the history of exceptions to the 
bar on character evidence,355 to courts’ expansive interpretations of 
the evidentiary rules.356 There is an even greater variance amongst 
jurisdictions in terms of (1) whether to allow the use of extrinsic 
evidence to prove the existence of a prior bad act; (2) whether evi-
dence of a prior non-conviction reported by third parties is admissi-
ble; (3) what the standard of admissibility should be regarding ex-
trinsic evidence of prior non-conviction acts; (4) whether a hearing 
should be conducted to determine admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence; (5) whether it can be proven that the allegation of a prior bad 
act is false; (6) how remote the reported prior non-conviction can be 
from the crime charged; and (7) what the proper scope of extrinsic 
evidence used to prove the existence of a prior non-conviction bad 
act should be.357 
The point of convergence, however, is the admission of a prior 
no-conviction reporting in cases of SGBV and no other types of 
cases,358 illustrating how the persistence of credibility discounting 
still drives and informs the decision-making process in admitting 
                                                                                                             
App. 2000) (acknowledging that the confrontation clause may require allowing 
impeachment with prior false accusations). 
 354 See, e.g., Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225–26 (acknowledging that the confronta-
tion clause may require allowing impeachment with prior false accusations, but 
declining to admit such evidence); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1989) (explaining how evidence of prior false accusations are relevant to the 
defendant’s confrontation rights, but declining to admit the alleged evidence be-
cause there was no indication of prior false accusations on behalf of the victim). 
 355 See e.g., Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 335 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (ex-
plaining that courts have allowed this type of evidence “consistent with the com-
mon-law doctrine that a party could present evidence of a witness’s ‘corruption’—
a term that encompassed evidence of (1) the witness’s general willingness to lie 
under oath, (2) the witness’s offer to give false testimony for money or other re-
ward, (3) the witness’s acknowledgement of having lied under oath on prior oc-
casions, (4) the witness’s attempt to bribe another witness, or (5) the witness’s 
pattern of presenting false legal claims.”). 
 356 See, e.g., Guenther, 854 A.2d at 326. 
 357 See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 666–73. 
 358 A Westlaw search using the Boolean terms and connectors “‘prior false 
allegations’ /s credibility” shows that the exceptions are made in SGBV cases. 
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this type of evidence.359 Admitting this type of evidence does not 
incorporate an analysis of the inherent process of victims in recant-
ing accusations and revising accounts.360 This failure ignores what 
we know about victims’ processing of the aggression and uses the 
evidence of a prior no-conviction reporting to the detriment of the 
victim to show that she must be lying in the current instance. Such 
an admission disregards that there are many reasons that a victim’s 
prior report resulted in a no-conviction, and that a prior report with 
a no-conviction does not automatically mean that the victim is ly-
ing.361 
Yet, the creation of exceptions to the admission of prior no-con-
viction reporting signals what might be truly relevant in specific acts 
of untruthfulness: whether the witness has lied in the past and has 
misused the judicial system in a similar context or in an analogous 
manner to the one in which she is currently a witness. This would 
not be to show the victim’s propensity to lie, but to show some kind 
of modus operandi or pattern by the victim, or to prove the victim’s 
bias or fabrication.362 However, because of the way in which some 
of these prior victim reporting exceptions are formulated, in practice 
the exceptions do not necessarily address these arguably valid 
goals.363 Admitting a victim’s prior no-conviction reporting without 
                                                                                                             
 359 See, e.g., State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (“The 
current Missouri rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations does 
not strike the appropriate balance. Therefore, a criminal defendant in Missouri 
may, in some cases, introduce extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations. This 
rule is not limited to sexual assault or rape cases.”). 
 360 See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40. 
 361 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 30–33 (discussing how reported 
SGBV cases have been mishandled by police leading to no arrest and rape kits 
sitting on shelves never to be tested). 
 362 See, e.g., State v. Botelho, 753 A.2d 343, 346 (R.I. 2000). 
 363 See id. (stating “that evidence of similar accusations by a complaining wit-
ness may be admissible to challenge the witness’s credibility. . . . The evidence 
may be admissible even when the allegations were never proven false or were 
never withdrawn. . . . [R]egardless of whether the accusations were made before 
or after those made in respect to a defendant.”) (internal citations omitted); People 
v. Diaz, 85 A.D.3d 1047, 1050 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (explaining that “[e]vidence 
of a complainant’s prior false allegations of rape or sexual abuse is admissible to 
impeach the complainant’s credibility [if the] defendant establishe[s] that the 
[prior] allegation may have been false[, and] . . . that the particulars of the com-
plaints, the circumstances or manner of the alleged assaults, or the currency of the 
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further analysis, even in cases of false accusations, can be problem-
atic. First, it goes against studies regarding a victim’s process of 
coming forward.364 Blind admission of prior reports assumes that 
such a specific act, in and of itself, proves that the victim might be 
currently lying when we know that that might not be the case,365 
especially in SGBV cases where recanting is a natural occurrence 
not always associated with untruthfulness.366 Second, not requiring 
a showing that the victim is currently misusing the judicial system, 
even in cases of prior false allegations, makes the relevancy of this 
evidence weak,367 especially in cases trying to prove pattern, bias, 
or fabrication. Moreover, it unduly prejudices the testimony of the 
victims as triers of fact can be over-persuaded by this type of evi-
dence.368 
One commentator, Kassandra Altantulkhuur, has focused on the 
admittance of these specific acts (i.e., prior no-conviction report-
ing).369 Altantulkhuur proposes requiring, in a separate hearing, “a 
defendant [who] seeks to use such information . . . to prove [that] 
                                                                                                             
complaints were such as to suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the va-
lidity of the charges made by the complainant, it is error for the trial court to pre-
clude evidence regarding the prior allegation.”) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tations omitted); Rayner v. Georgia, 706 S.E.2d 205, 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that “[e]vidence of prior false allegations of sexual misconduct is admis-
sible to attack the witness’s credibility and as substantive evidence in support of 
the argument that the charged offense did not occur. However, to protect the com-
plaining witness from unfounded allegations that the witness has made similar 
false allegations in the past, before such evidence can be admitted, the trial court 
is required to make a threshold determination outside the jury’s presence that a 
reasonable probability of falsity exists.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Blair v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1225, 1233–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting 
that “[e]vidence of prior false accusations may be admitted only if 1) the com-
plaining witness admits that she had made a prior false accusation of rape; or 2) 
the accusation is demonstrably false.”); Tibbs v. Allen, 486 F. Supp. 2d 188, 196 
(D. Mass. 2007) (observing that under Massachusetts law, evidence of an alleged 
rape victim’s prior false allegations of rape is “admissible [ ] only when there is a 
pattern of prior false accusations; one false accusation does not a pattern make.”). 
 364 See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40. 
 365 See Okun, supra note 35, at 546–49, 565–66; Roberts, supra note 36, at 
1996; Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence, supra note 36, at 
1051–53; Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 208–209. 
 366 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 17–18. 
 367 See Johnson, supra note 21, at 372. 
 368 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 268, at 775–76. 
 369 Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1097–99. 
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the prior accusation is demonstrably false.”370 Her proposal “would 
require defendants to show by clear, convincing, and substantial 
proof that the victim actually made a false accusation.”371 Once that 
determination is made, the court should consider the prejudicial ef-
fect of allowing the evidence, barring admission of the no-convic-
tion report if the court determines that the defendant is only trying 
to prove propensity.372 
Although such a proposal would deal with the problems of al-
lowing impeachment through a prior no-conviction reporting, it 
would distract the court from the real issue, which is the current ac-
cusation.373 It would also mean having a new trial within a trial, 
which would mean more resources, time, and money spent litigating 
this issue.374 While Altantukhuur’s proposal deals with some of the 
issues of specific acts of untruthfulness,375 it does not deal with all 
of them and ignores the type of specific acts of untruthfulness that 
can be introduced in more than eighty percent of jurisdictions; fur-
ther demonstrating the need for a rule that is more comprehensive to 
protect victims of SGBV and facilitate the fair trial of these types of 
cases. 
The need for a more comprehensive rule becomes more apparent 
when we consider the only jurisdiction in the United States that pre-
viously implemented a total bar on the use of prior acts of untruth-
fulness as impeachment evidence: California. Prior to 1982, Califor-
nia had a complete bar on the use of specific acts evidence in both 
criminal and civil cases.376 However in 1982, voters approved the 
Right to Truth in Evidence Proposition amendment to the California 
                                                                                                             
 370 Id. at 1120–21. 
 371 Id. at 1121. 
 372 Id. at 1121–22. 
 373 See Montan, supra note 38, at 460 (“One of the general dangers presented 
by specific-instance character evidence is the potential to confuse or distract the 
jury from the substantive issues being tried. Evidence of specific acts is usually 
not relevant to the issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for 
the jury.”). 
 374 See id. at 463. 
 375 See generally, Altantulkhuur, supra note 50. 
 376 Miguel A. Méndez, Comparing the Federal Rules of Evidence with the 
California Evidence Code-Proposition 8 and the Wisdom of Using Initiatives As 
A Rule-Making Device, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 571, 577 (2008); Miguel A. Méndez, 
Resurrecting California’s Old Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005, 
1008 (1992). 
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evidence rules to prevent the exclusion (with few exceptions) of rel-
evant evidence in criminal proceedings.377 With the enactment of 
the amendment, the bar against the use of prior acts existed only in 
the civil context, while in the criminal setting the rules are even more 
liberal than their federal counterpart.378 As a result, California had 
fewer victims reporting crimes in categories such as sexual abuse 
and domestic violence.379 Rape crisis counselors stated under oath 
that they knew of victims who decided not to come forward because 
of the reform in the law.380 This information from California sug-
gests a correlation between the use of character for untruthfulness 
impeachment strategies and under-reporting, under-prosecution, 
and under-conviction.381 Moreover, the change in victim reporting 
after California’s change in its evidentiary laws suggests that vic-
tims are less likely to come forward when the defendant can inquire 
into character for untruthfulness evidence.382 
Like California, Tennessee has also distanced itself from the 
FRE in terms of the use of prior acts of untruthfulness as impeach-
ment evidence. Although Tennessee does allow specific acts of un-
truthfulness to be used during impeachment, it allows this only after 
a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the factual 
basis and probative value of the prior act if the act was done within 
10 years of the commencement of the current action.383 If the spe-
cific act is older than 10 years, the court is required to consider the 
                                                                                                             
 377 Friedland, supra note 242, at 5. 
 378 Id. at 7–8. 
 379 See id. at 27. 
 380 Id. 
 381 Establishing a causal link between the under-adjudication in favor of vic-
tims and the use of prior acts of untruthfulness to impeach victims’ character for 
untruthfulness is extremely difficult as there are many variables that cannot be 
controlled in a study. For example, it is difficult to compare jurisdictions that have 
more limited rules than the FRE, such as Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas, with jurisdictions that 
have adopted FRE 608(b) because the existence of other rules and procedures that 
are different in those jurisdictions can affect the outcome, and therefore, impede 
the establishment of a causal link. Moreover, there is little to no point in only 
looking at statistics within jurisdictions that completely bar the use of prior acts 
because such a ban on prior bad acts evidence would apply, for the most part, 
across the board to all adjudications, not just in SGBV cases. 
 382 Friedland, supra note 242, at 27, 29. 
 383 Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, titled “Evidence of Charac-
ter and Conduct of Witness,” provides: 
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(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character – The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject 
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evi-
dence of truthful character is admissible only after the char-
acter of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct – Specific instances of con-
duct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting 
the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than convic-
tions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved 
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following con-
ditions, be inquired into on cross-examination of the wit-
ness concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness or concerning the character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which the char-
acter witness being cross-examined has testified. The con-
ditions which must be satisfied before allowing inquiry on 
cross-examination about such conduct probative solely of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness are: 
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the 
jury’s presence and must determine that the alleged 
conduct has probative value and that a reasonable fac-
tual basis exists for the inquiry; 
(2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten years 
before commencement of the action or prosecution, 
but evidence of a specific instance of conduct not qual-
ifying under this paragraph (2) is admissible if the pro-
ponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the ad-
verse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 
such evidence and the court determines in the interests 
of justice that the probative value of that evidence, 
supported by specific facts and circumstances, sub-
stantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and 
(3) If the witness to be impeached is the accused in a crim-
inal prosecution, the State must give the accused rea-
sonable written notice of the impeaching conduct be-
fore trial, and the court upon request must determine 
that the conduct’s probative value on credibility out-
weighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive 
issues. The court may rule on the admissibility of such 
proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior 
to the testimony of the accused. If the court makes a 
final determination that such proof is admissible for 
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prejudicial effect of the evidence, as compared to the probative 
value.384 Although this safeguard is a great addition, it might not 
protect victims of SGBV effectively. The standard to allow the spe-
cific acts is whether it has probative value and a reasonable factual 
basis for the inquiry.385 While this standard is better than the current 
good faith basis usually employed to determine whether an attorney 
can question about a prior bad act,386 it is still a pretty low standard 
to meet, considering that socially, we overvalue prior acts of un-
truthfulness as predictors of character for truthfulness.387 Moreover, 
as discussed supra Part II, if judges do not have more particularized 
guidance on allowing that type of evidence in cases of SGBV, they 
will fail to see the need to exclude it, as they operate as the rest of 
society under the credibility biases associated with women and vic-
tims.388 
In fact, case law applying Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608 
suggests that when more specific guidance is given to judges, issues 
                                                                                                             
impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually 
testify at the trial to later challenge the propriety of the 
determination. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any 
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the wit-
ness’s privilege against self-incrimination when exam-
ined with respect to matters which relate only to char-
acter for truthfulness. 
(c) Juvenile Conduct – Evidence of specific instances of con-
duct of a witness committed while the witness was a juve-
nile is generally not admissible under this rule. The court 
may, however, allow evidence of such conduct of a witness 
other than the accused in a criminal case if the conduct 
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and 
the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination in a civil action or criminal 
proceeding. 
TENN. R. EVID. 608. 
 384 TENN. R. EVID. 608(b)(2). 
 385 Id. 
 386 See United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 970 (5th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1528–29 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 387 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 268, at 775–76. 
 388 See, e.g., St. Joan, supra note 131, at 265–66. 
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related to the prejudicial effects of character evidence for truthful-
ness can be reduced.389 For example, in a rape case, the trial and the 
appellate court following Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608 ex-
cluded evidence of the victim’s bad checks and fraudulent conduct 
during marriage because the lower court found no reasonable basis 
for the questions and because of the remoteness of the conduct.390 
Accordingly, a rule to better regulate the use of prior acts in cases of 
SGBV should include more specific standards rather than a good 
faith basis and FRE 403 and 611 protections. 
In sum, the current landscape on the impeachment of character 
for truthfulness illustrates the need for a rule that protects SGBV 
victims during cross-examination. No state has such a protection. 
Moreover, as discussed, the limited protections against the prejudi-
cial effects of evidence for untruthful character do not require evi-
dence of a victim’s untruthfulness to be related to current specific 
acts of misusing the judicial system, nor do the protections consider 
how attorneys use this evidence to argue cases predicated on the so-
cietal credibility discounting of SGBV victims.391 
B.  Proposed Rule for the Impeachment of SGBV Victims’ 
Character for Truthfulness 
The proposal presented here attempts to fill the gaps in the FRE 
in a way that could help transform society’s perception of women’s 
credibility and SGBV victims. Considering that the majority of ju-
risdictions, in one way or another, follow the FRE,392 the language 
used in the proposal is based on the language employed by the FRE. 
New language is italicized, while existing FRE language remains in 
plain typeface. 
The Rule envisions three different balancing tests depending on 
the type of character for truthfulness evidence and lists concrete fac-
tors to aid courts in weighing the probative value of the character for 
untruthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects, specifically 
in SGBV cases. It also provides for a hearing presided over by a 
                                                                                                             
 389 See, e.g., State v. Manning, No. 03C01-9501-CR-00012, 1998 WL 103317, 
at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 390 Id. 
 391 See supra Part II. 
 392 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 186. 
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separate judge when the evidence at issue is character for untruth-
fulness evidence in the form of specific instances. The proposed rule 
attempts to temper the prejudicial effects caused by credibility bi-
ases while balancing other considerations, such as a long-standing 
tradition of impeaching witnesses with evidence for untruthfulness, 
the constitutional protections in criminal cases, and judicial effi-
ciency. This procedure would ensure that SGBV victims enjoy a 
more impartial trial, while preserving the core values of our criminal 
and probative systems. 
 
Rule 101X. SCOPE; DEFINITIONS 
* * * 
(b) Definitions. 
* * * 
(7) “sexual and gender-based violence cases” refers to criminal 
or civil cases regarding intimate partner violence, sexual assault, 
rape, sexual harassment, and stealthing. 
 
Rule 403X. EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, WASTE OF TIME, OR OTHER 
REASONS 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the fol-
lowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative ev-
idence. 
 
Rule 608X. WITNESS’S CHARACTER FOR 
TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. 
A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testi-
mony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion 
about said character. 
In cases involving sexual and gender-based violence, if the only 
testimony to support the character for untruthfulness of the victim is 
in the form of an opinion or reputation provided by the defendant, 
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the court may admit the evidence if it determines, following the fac-
tors enumerated in Rule 416X(b)(4), that the probative value of the 
evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects. 
Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the wit-
ness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked. 
(b) Prior Convictions. 
(1) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a wit-
ness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal convic-
tion: 
(a) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punisha-
ble by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evi-
dence: 
(i) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403X, in a civil case or in 
a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant, except as 
provided in (ii); 
(ii) in a civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case, 
the prior conviction of the victim must be admitted only after the 
court determines, following the factors enumerated in Rule 
416X(b)(4) and any evidence of an incentive to plead, that the pro-
bative value of the evidence about the victim’s character for untruth-
fulness is not outweighed or closely balanced by its prejudicial ef-
fect; and 
(iii) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is 
a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to that defendant; 
(b) for any crime regardless of the punishment that, in the con-
victing jurisdiction, required proving—or the witness’s admitting—
a dishonest act or false statement, the evidence: 
(i) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403X, in a civil case or in 
a criminal case except as provided in (ii); and 
(ii) in a civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case, 
the prior conviction of the victim must be admitted only after the 
court determines, following the factors enumerated in Rule 
416X(b)(4) and any evidence of an incentive to plead, that the pro-
bative value of the evidence about the victim’s character for untruth-
fulness substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects. 
(2) Limit on Using the Evidence After 5 Years. This subdivision 
(2) applies if more than 5 years have passed since the witness’s con-
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viction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evi-
dence of the conviction is admissible after the proponent gives the 
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it, so that 
the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use, only if: 
(a) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circum-
stances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; 
(b) in a case of a victim’s prior conviction in a sexual and gen-
der-based violence case, after the court determines following the 
factors enumerated in Rule 416X(b)(4) that the probative value of 
the evidence is not outweighed or closely balanced by its prejudicial 
effect; and 
(c) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written no-
tice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to 
contest its use. 
(3) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilita-
tion. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if: 
(a) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on 
a finding that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has 
not been convicted of a later crime punishable by death or by im-
prisonment for more than one year; or 
(b) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(4) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication 
is admissible under this rule only if: 
(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant; 
(3) an adult’s conviction for that offense would be admissible to 
attack the adult’s credibility; and 
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt 
or innocence. 
(5) Pendency of an Appeal. A conviction that satisfies this rule 
is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of the pendency 
is also admissible. 
(c) Prior Acts of Untruthfulness. (Specific Instances of Con-
duct) 
Except for a criminal conviction under the special rules pro-
vided in section (b) of this rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible 
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to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct to attack or sup-
port the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on 
cross-examination, allow the opposing party to inquire into such 
specific acts of untruthfulness if they are probative of the character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-ex-
amined has testified about. 
If the character for truthfulness being called into question is that 
of a victim in a sexual and gender-based violence case, the court 
must follow the procedure established in Rule 416X before allowing 
the impeachment with a prior act of untruthfulness. 
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any 
privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to 
the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
 
Rule 416X. IMPEACHMENT OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE VICTIMS WITH PRIOR ACTS OF 
UNTRUTHFULNESS 
(a) Requirement of a Hearing Presided Over by a Different 
Judge. 
In any civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case, 
the defense may inquire into specific acts of untruthfulness of the 
victim, provided that the court in a hearing presided over by a sep-
arate judge or magistrate, determines, following the procedures set 
out in this rule, that the evidence about the victim’s character for 
untruthfulness is not outweighed or is closely balanced by its preju-
dicial effect, the confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated, 
or the possibility of misleading the jury. 
(b) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. 
(1) Motion. A defendant that intends to offer evidence about the 
character for untruthfulness of a sexual and gender-based violence 
victim, in the form of specific acts must: 
1. file a motion that specifically states the intention to use evi-
dence in the form of specific acts to impeach the character for truth-
fulness of the victim, and lists and describes the specific acts of un-
truthfulness; 
2. do so at least 14 days prior to the commencement of the trial, 
unless the court, for good cause, sets a different time before trial; 
80 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
i. in all civil cases, if the defendant does not file the motion 
within the period established, the defendant will waive the right to 
present such evidence; 
ii. in all criminal cases, if the defendant does not file the motion 
before the commencement of the trial, the defendant must at least do 
so before the victim testifies; if not the defendant will waive his right 
to present such evidence, unless the Court determines that said evi-
dence is of exculpatory nature; 
3. serve the motion on all parties; and 
4. notify the victim or, when appropriate, the victim’s guardian 
or representative. 
(2) Evidence to be Presented by the Defendant. The defendant 
can present evidence of the following: 
1. the specific acts of untruthfulness; 
2. how those specific acts are related to a claim that the victim 
is currently misusing the judicial system or has done so in the past; 
3. the victim maliciously or falsely filed civil or criminal sexual 
and gender-based violence actions in the past; 
4. the victim intends to cause harm to the defendant beyond the 
negative effects commonly associated with a judicial action by filing 
the current cause of action; 
5. proof of the victim’s character for untruthfulness; and 
6. any other evidence that would make the use of specific acts 
of untruthfulness more reliable. 
The use of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Such use of extrinsic 
evidence is exclusively for the purposes of the hearing under this 
Rule. 
(3) Evidence to be Presented by the Victim or on the Victim’s 
behalf. The prosecution, the plaintiff, or the Appointed Attorney can 
present evidence of the following: 
1. the character for truthfulness of the victim; 
2. the lack of evidence about the victim currently misusing the 
judicial system or having done so in the past; 
3. the remoteness of the specific acts; 
4. any evidence to rebut the veracity of the specific act of un-
truthfulness; 
5. testimony explaining the recanting of charges; or 
6. any other evidence that would make the use of specific acts 
of untruthfulness less reliable. 
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The use of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Such use of extrinsic 
evidence is exclusively for the purposes of the hearing under this 
Rule. The victim is not required to present any evidence in order for 
the court to make its determination. 
(4) Factors to Consider. In making its determinations in (5) and 
(6), the court should consider the following factors: 
1. amount and scope of the evidence of character for untruth-
fulness; 
2. how the evidence proves character for untruthfulness; 
3. how the evidence of character for untruthfulness is related 
to a claim that the victim is currently misusing the judicial system 
or has done so in the past; 
4. remoteness of the specific acts; 
5. evidence of the veracity or falsity of the acts, the opinion, or 
reputation; 
6. evidence of the victim maliciously or falsely filing civil or 
criminal sexual and gender-based violence actions in the past; 
7. evidence of the character for truthfulness of the victim; 
8. evidence explaining the recanting or presentation of previ-
ous allegations of sexual and gender-based violence; and 
9. any other evidence that would speak to the reliability of us-
ing the evidence to determine character for untruthfulness or truth-
fulness. 
(5) Probative Value Outweighed. After the hearing, if the court 
determines that the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s 
untruthful character is closely balanced or outweighed by the unfair 
prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the is-
sues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or 
the judge, the court will issue a written order stating that any line of 
inquiry into those issues will not be allowed during the trial and the 
defense will be sanctioned if it disregards said order. In making such 
determination the court must balance the probative value of the ev-
idence and its prejudicial effect considering the factors listed in Rule 
416X(b)(4). 
(6) Concerns Outweighed. After the hearing, if the Court deter-
mines that the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s un-
truthful character is not closely balanced nor outweighed by the un-
fair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the 
issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or 
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the judge, the court will issue an order stating which specific acts 
may be inquired into during cross-examination in the trial with the 
purpose of impeaching the victim’s character for truthfulness. The 
scope of such cross-examination will be limited to the occurrence of 
the specific act in question. In making such determination the court 
must balance the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial 
effect considering the factors listed in Rule 416X(b)(4). 
(7) Appointment of Attorney Under Special Circumstances. In 
criminal cases, if the court understands that the interests of the vic-
tim are not being adequately represented by the State,or the victim’s 
safety is in peril, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the 
victim during the hearing or the victim’s testimony in trial. In all 
civil cases, if the court determines that self-representation could re-
sult in undue psychological burden to the victim or the victim’s 
safety is in peril, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the 
victim during the hearing or the victim’s testimony in trial. 
(8) Sealed Hearing and Materials. Unless the court orders oth-
erwise, the motion, related materials, and the record of the hearing 
must be and remain sealed. 
C.  Advisory Comments on the Rule 
As can be inferred, the purpose of the Rule is to prevent attor-
neys from accessing credibility biases based on trustworthiness and 
plausibility and using them as part of their defense to discount the 
victim’s testimony, while respecting the reliance jurisdictions grant 
to character evidence for untruthfulness. To do so, the Rule attempts 
to temper our knowledge of the phenomenon that evidence of char-
acter for untruthfulness is not a good predictor of a witness lying 
during a trial with the well-established practice of admitting this 
type of evidence in judicial proceedings, especially in SGBV cases. 
To balance all of the interests at stake, including the right of con-
frontation, the Rule envisions the use of three different standards 
which depend on the form of the evidence for character for untruth-
fulness and its perceived reliability as a predictor of a witness lying. 
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1. BALANCING TESTS 
For evidence that is perceived to be most reliable—evidence in 
the form of reputation or opinion—for determining a witness’s char-
acter for untruthfulness,393 the standard would remain the one set 
forth in FRE 403. On the other hand, for categorically less reliable 
evidence, such as prior convictions and specific acts of untruthful-
ness,394 the proposed Rule establishes two different standards and 
instructs the court to take into account specific factors associated 
with SGBV cases, such as the inherent biases involved in these types 
of cases. These factors will aid the court in making a more accurate 
determination of the prejudicial effects of character for untruthful-
ness evidence in SGBV cases. The two different standards available 
for such an analysis also recognize that there is a diverse degree of 
perceived reliability of the various forms of character for untruthful-
ness evidence.395 
For prior convictions other than crimen falsi and specific acts of 
untruthfulness, which have been categorized as the least reliable 
form of character evidence,396 the Rule provides a more stringent 
standard: impeachment with character for untruthfulness evidence 
is prohibited if the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s 
untruthful character is closely balanced or outweighed by the unfair 
prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the is-
sues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or 
the judge. However, for prior convictions for crimen falsi, evidence 
in the form of opinion or reputation supported solely by the defend-
ant, or prior convictions older than five years, the standard would be 
an intermediate balancing test as to whether the probative value sub-
stantially outweighs the prejudicial effects. 
2. SEPARATE HEARING FOR DETERMINING IMPEACHMENT WITH 
PRIOR ACTS OF UNTRUTHFULNESS 
                                                                                                             
 393 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discuss-
ing the use of reputation and opinion evidence over time and the reliance on such 
evidence). 
 394 See Gold, supra note 268, at 774. 
 395 Compare Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86, with 
Gold, supra note 268, at 774. 
 396 See Gold, supra note 268, at 774. 
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In the case of specific acts, the Rule also requires a hearing pre-
sided over by a separate judge or magistrate. As discussed, prior acts 
of untruthfulness are the least reliable type of character for untruth-
fulness evidence but the most persuasive in leading a fact finder to 
think that a witness is lying.397 Thus, in order to balance the right of 
confrontation in criminal cases and the extended practice of relying 
on evidence of character for untruthfulness with specific act evi-
dence’s inherently prejudicial effects,398 the Rule contemplates both 
a hearing and a more stringent standard to determine whether this 
type of evidence should be admitted. 
Contrary to the proceeding laid out in Tennessee’s Rule of Evi-
dence 608 or a Daubert hearing,399 the proposed Rule requires a 
hearing to be presided over by a judge other than the one that will 
be presiding over the underlying SGBV matter. This serves to better 
protect the impartiality of the court proceedings by shielding the par-
ties from potential future biased adjudications and avoiding parties 
strategizing in response to their perception of the judge’s rulings. As 
enumerated in proposed Rule 416X(b)(3)–(4), the hearing calls for 
the disclosure of evidence that the parties could present during the 
trial. Even if during the hearing the parties do not present evidence 
that could come up again, the totality of the separate proceeding 
could influence future rulings. 
Triers of fact do not forget about evidence presented just because 
it has not been admitted into evidence.400 In fact, jurors tend to ra-
tionalize their judgments based on evidence excluded using the evi-
dence admitted.401 This integrative process is not exclusive to jurors, 
as judges are susceptible to it as well.402 Considering the adverse 
effects this integrative process could have on both the defendant’s 
case and the victim’s testimony, the proposed Rule 416X breaks 
                                                                                                             
 397 See id. 
 398 See supra Part II. 
 399 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 
(1993) (explaining the factors a court must consider to determine if an expert is 
qualified before allowing him to testify). 
 400 See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 58, at 1053. 
 401 Id.; see also Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 58, at 257. 
 402 See St. Joan, supra note 131, at 282 (“Ample evidence indicates that many 
judges adopt the dominant cultural myths about domestic violence and fail to un-
derstand the common experiences of abused women. Some judges deeply resist 
evidence that could challenge their cultural beliefs about domestic violence.”). 
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away from the fiction that judges, contrary to jurors, would be able 
to compartmentalize the information and ignore the evidence that 
has not been admitted. 
By having a different judge decide the admissibility of the evi-
dence of specific acts of untruthfulness, the Rule seeks to preserve 
the impartiality and fairness needed for the decision-making pro-
cess. Under the proposed Rule, the court, during the separate hear-
ing, would hear any relevant extrinsic evidence. In order to avoid 
the trier of fact’s rulings being unfairly influenced by the infor-
mation presented at this previous admissibility hearing—while also 
protecting the privacy of the victim—the Rule requires that the hear-
ing is conducted by a separate judge or magistrate and that the rec-
ord, motions, and related materials be sealed. 
This has the added benefit of preventing the parties from adapt-
ing their trial strategies to fit the parties’ perception of the judge’s 
disposition simply based on what the judge ruled at the preliminary 
admissibility hearing. For example, the parties will not have to de-
cide whether to ask the judge to recuse himself because it appears 
that the evidence discussed during the hearing could influence his 
rulings during the trial. In that way, parties will not have to enter 
into a cost-benefit analysis about losing political capital with the 
judge by moving to recuse him. In addition, the parties will not have 
to consider how certain evidence that was not discussed during the 
hearing will play out in light of what transpired during the previous 
proceeding. The sealed nature of the preliminary admissibility hear-
ing, as well as the use of a second, independent judge, allows the 
parties to maintain a clean slate with the actual trial judge. 
These safeguards make the procedures in Rule 416X different 
from those under Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608. Tennessee’s 
Rule of Evidence 608 calls for a determination that “the alleged con-
duct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists 
for the inquiry.” Contrary to Rule 416X, this procedure does not en-
tail presenting evidence that could not be introduced during the trial. 
Thus, the proposed Rule 416X protects the impartiality of the up-
coming proceedings. 
A similar reasoning explains the safeguards Rule 416X provides 
that are not available at a Daubert hearing,403 namely that a Rule 
                                                                                                             
 403 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
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416X hearing must be presided over by a different judge. The pur-
pose of a Daubert hearing is to determine whether the expert meets 
the requisite level of qualifications and that the testimony is based 
on reliable methodologies.404 In essence, a Daubert hearing can be 
compared to a more stringent voir dire of the witness that is removed 
from the presence of the jury to prevent misleading them. However, 
even if the court, contrary to Rule 416X, is never asked to hear evi-
dence that is excluded from trial, parties could theoretically delve 
into matters that may later come up in trial during an expert’s voir 
dire. Yet, what is being ascertained in the Daubert hearing is how 
to interpret facts that are already part of the record.405 On the other 
hand, the procedure of proposed Rule 416X seeks to determine if 
the evidence regarding the credibility of the witness who is provid-
ing relevant testimony should be admitted. As a result, the extent of 
what the court is doing in a Daubert hearing is vastly different from 
a Rule 416X hearing. 
The Daubert hearing decides the admissibility of an expert’s in-
terpretation by looking at her qualifications and methodology.406 
Once the court determines that an expert’s interpretation of the facts 
should not be heard, that interpretation of the facts will have no bear-
ing on the case.407 And if the expert testimony is admitted, the court 
essentially makes a determination that the testimony should be con-
sidered by the jury.408 This implies that there is no real issue of the 
judge’s future rulings being unfairly colored by the hearing. 
Rule 416X, in contrast, is looking at evidence that affects the 
credibility of a witness. The risk of contaminating the judge with 
evidence that could later be determined to have no bearing on the 
credibility of the witness is therefore always present and could affect 
either of the parties in unpredictable ways.409 This critical difference 
between the Daubert hearing and the hearing under Rule 416X war-
rants that the latter needs to be presided over by a different judge as 
opposed to the former, which does not necessarily need a separate 
judge. 
                                                                                                             
 404 Id. at 592–94. 
 405 Id. at 591–92. 
 406 Id. at 592–94. 
 407 See id. at 597. 
 408 See id. at 595. 
 409 See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 405 (noting how judges tend to 
disbelieve victims of SGBV). 
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3. REALIGNMENT OF ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACTS WITH  
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
The Rule also tries to harmonize impeachment by character for 
untruthfulness evidence using specific non-criminal untruthful acts 
with impeachment by prior convictions. As discussed, these are both 
technically specific acts, which only differ as to the criminality of 
the act and the prior judicial determination that the act has oc-
curred.410 For that reason, the proposed Rule employs a different 
balancing test for prior convictions because that type of specific acts 
evidence is generally perceived as more reliable than specific acts 
of non-criminal untruthfulness evidence.411 However, there is no 
reason to have two different standards regarding the time span re-
quired for admission or whether the evidence is subject to FRE 403 
analysis. Accordingly, the proposed Rule departs from the FRE by 
subjecting all prior convictions for crimen falsi (in non-SGBV 
cases) to a FRE 403 analysis and by limiting the use of both prior 
acts of untruthfulness and prior convictions to a time limit of five 
years. 
The Rule rejects the FRE’s idea that prior acts of untruthfulness 
could be admissible irrespective of when they occurred, while prior 
convictions could be admissible only if they are not older than ten 
years.412 It is counterintuitive to limit impeachment with a prior con-
viction and not limit it as to a prior bad act whose criminality is less 
and to which the witness has no incentive of remembering.413 Be-
cause of the lack of incentive to remember a non-serious, prior bad 
act,414 the Rule limits its use to acts within the last five years, so that 
the witness could have a better memory when responding to the im-
peachment. 
                                                                                                             
 410 Compare FED. R. EVID. 608(b), with FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 411 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discuss-
ing the use of reputation and opinion evidence over time and the reliance on such 
evidence); Gold, supra note 268, at 774 (“Of the four types of witness evidence, 
[noncriminal] misconduct evidence provides the weakest basis for making a gen-
eralization about truthfulness.”). 
 412 Compare FED. R. EVID. 608, with FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 413 Gold, supra note 268, at 775. 
 414 Id. 
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4. COUNSEL FOR VICTIM 
In addition, the proposed Rule provides for the appointment of a 
victim’s counsel in cases in which the interests of the victim are not 
adequately represented. This addition of a possible trilateral process 
is based on the recognition that the objectives of prosecutors and 
victims diverge greatly in terms of the protection of victims’ pri-
vacy, impeachment of victims, and standards for measuring the suc-
cess of the case.415 Professor Lininger poignantly describes these 
tensions by stating  
prosecutors do not share victims’ sense of urgency in 
protecting against disclosure of sensitive personal in-
formation. Prosecutors are generally very cautious 
about making evidentiary objections. They fear ob-
jections will signal to jurors that the government has 
something to hide. Another reason why prosecutors 
may forego valid objections is that by giving defense 
counsel wide leeway, prosecutors eliminate possible 
appellate grounds. Prosecutors have an ethical and 
constitutional obligation to disclose material that un-
dermines the credibility of the prosecution’s wit-
nesses. Cynical prosecutors may believe that defense 
harassment of accusers is helpful because it may out-
rage the jury and increase the likelihood of convic-
tion. Victims, on the other hand, have no ethical ob-
ligation to be forthright about their foibles, and they 
have a much stronger interest in privacy. 
There is a second reason why the bilateral adversarial 
model inaccurately describes the relationship be-
tween prosecutors and victims: The government fre-
quently impeaches accusers. . . . The convergence of 
“no drop” policies and stricter confrontation require-
ments make such impeachment far more likely than 
in the past.416 
                                                                                                             
 415 Lininger, supra note 241, at 1394. 
 416 Id. at 1394–95. In addition to those reasons, Professor Lininger also adds 
that: 
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Considering these tensions, it is important that the victims have 
a mechanism to make sure that events that might have no bearing to 
the cause of action do not come up and that someone protects the 
victim from such inquiries.417 We currently lack such a mechanism 
in SGBV cases, and the Rule seeks to correct that by providing coun-
sel for the victim at the hearing and during the trial. Even if the hear-
ing does serve as an incentive for the prosecution to defend the in-
terests and privacy of the victim, the prosecutor might have a strat-
egy that does not guarantee that victims would be protected from 
impeachment to her character for untruthfulness.418 For that reason, 
the possibility of a trilateral process is of utmost importance if the 
system seeks to correct the problems of under-prosecution.419 This 
representation should also extend to civil cases when the victims are 
                                                                                                             
One final reason for the discordant relationship between the 
prosecutor and the accuser is the different standard by which 
the two groups measure the success of a prosecution. Prosecu-
tors have a short-term perspective. They focus on the jury ver-
dict and the length of the sentence. A guilty verdict and a long 
sentence mean that the prosecution has prevailed; an acquittal 
or a short sentence brings disappointment. Prosecutors have 
other ancillary concerns such as managing huge caseloads and 
maintaining good relationships with repeat players in criminal 
court, but their primary concern is the “scorecard” of convic-
tions and jail time. The accuser, for her part, has a far different 
gauge for measuring the success of a prosecution. A prosecu-
tion is successful for the accuser if it facilitates her long-term 
emotional recovery, strengthens her sense of self-determina-
tion, and leaves open the possibility of rebuilding interpersonal 
relationships (perhaps even with the defendant). In addition, the 
victim hopes that the prosecution will improve – or at least not 
limit – the odds of success in parallel civil litigation; prosecu-
tors are subject to ethical rules that prohibit them from taking 
actions to assist civil proceedings, and prosecutors typically re-
gard parallel civil litigation as a nuisance that hinders the attain-
ment of prosecutorial goals. 
Id. at 1395–96. 
 417 For example, a trilateral process could have helped Jennifer when she felt 
that the prosecutor was not interested in defending her interest. See supra Part I. 
 418 See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1394–95. 
 419 As Professor Lininger suggests, the trilateral process should be a possibil-
ity in every SGBV case and even more extensive than the processes proposed 
here. Lininger, supra note 241, at 1396. 
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proceeding pro se, as a way to level the playing field and avoid un-
due revictimization. 
The Rule, however, does not protect against the revictimization 
that can happen due to the prosecution’s impeachment of the victim 
because of no-drop prosecutions or declaration of the victim as a 
hostile witness.420 Rule 416X only operates when an opposing party 
impeaches an SGBV victim’s character for truthfulness and in no 
other context. This would allow jurisdictions that believe no-drop 
prosecution rules are necessary to continue that practice.421 
5. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 
Further, the Rule attempts to make the proceedings as fair as 
possible by requiring the defendant to notify the prosecution or the 
victim of his intention to use evidence of specific acts of untruthful-
ness and list the acts intended to be used. Part of the problem with 
using specific acts of untruthfulness is that contrary to other forms 
of character for untruthfulness evidence, “to the extent that miscon-
duct evidence is weak or even misleading, the witness [the victim] 
may be ill prepared to explain the defects of that evidence.”422 Giv-
ing the victim the opportunity to rebut the evidence puts the court in 
a better position to weigh the probative value of the evidence of 
character for untruthfulness against its prejudicial effects. In crimi-
nal cases, the Rule seeks to balance the right to confrontation with 
the notification requirement, by providing that the defendant has un-
til the commencement of the trial to file the motion and notify the 
prosecution and the victim before waiving his right to use this evi-
dence. Finally, as a corollary of the trilateral process, the Rule pro-
vides for the motion to be sent directly to the victim, this way the 
victim can decide whether to initiate the trilateral process. 
In sum, the Rule respects the reliance our evidentiary system 
grants to character evidence for untruthfulness and the right of con-
frontation while making trials of SGBV cases fairer by preventing 
attorneys from accessing biased narratives about victims’ lack of 
credibility and using them as part of their defense. 
                                                                                                             
 420 Id. at 1362. 
 421 However, as Professor Lininger advocates, these jurisdictions should in-
corporate the trilateral process at least for proceedings in which the interests of 
the victims collide with those of the prosecution. Id. at 1395–96. 
 422 Gold supra, note 268, at 775. 
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D.  Proposed Rule for Impeachment in Action 
Applying the Rule to Jennifer’s case423 shows how the Rule 
could affect outcomes and shield the process from biases. In Jen-
nifer’s case, the evidence regarding the lies on Facebook, the loan 
application, the use of a married name, and the extra-marital preg-
nancy constitute prior acts of untruthfulness. Thus, the admissibility 
of such evidence would be a matter to be adjudicated during the sep-
arate hearing established in Rule 416X. However, the evidence of 
bias (divorce and future litigation), contradiction (Facebook posts 
not showing bad moments and car buying), perception (mental 
health and drug use), and lack of verification (no previous police 
reports and no reporting to friends or family) would not be subject 
to the hearing procedure established in Rule 416X as they are not 
specific acts of untruthfulness. That means that the defendant would 
be able to introduce that evidence subject to FRE 403X and FRE 
608X. 
When the court considers the evidence of Jennifer’s prior acts 
under Rule 416X, it should conclude that all of the specific acts in 
Jennifer’s case should be excluded. The defense has four acts to 
show that Jennifer has a character for untruthfulness. However, the 
court should not only consider the quantity of specific acts but how 
probative these acts are of the victim lying. In Jennifer’s case, two 
of the four acts are inconsequential acts of untruthfulness related to 
social expectations that do not tell the court whether a person would 
lie in a judicial proceeding. For the most part, people do not air their 
problems on social media; rather, they portray the good aspects of 
their lives.424 It can be said that because people only portray the 
good aspects of their lives, it follows that they know others are doing 
the same.425 
The same can be said about Jennifer using a married name when 
she was not legally married. This conduct may just reflect a desire 
                                                                                                             
 423 See supra Part I. 
 424 Helmut Appel et al., The Interplay Between Facebook Use, Social Com-
parison, Envy, and Depression, 9 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 44, 44 (2016) 
(stating that “[i]n [ ] Facebook profiles, users communicate abundant social com-
parison information conveying mainly positive self-portrayals.”). 
 425 See id. 
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to keep matters about one’s love live private.426 Again, this is con-
duct that people would likely not attach much meaning to in terms 
of a person’s character for untruthfulness, especially because un-
married people can struggle to find words to properly describe the 
specific contours of their relationships.427 
In contrast, people would likely attach more meaning to some-
one’s infidelity when assessing that person’s character for untruth-
fulness.428 Common sense dictates that the average juror would 
probably think it is more deceitful to be unfaithful to a spouse than 
it is to lie on Facebook or lie about one’s civil marital status. Yet, in 
Jennifer’s case the conduct is not even that meaningful in terms of 
deceit because the alleged “infidelity” took place when the couple 
had already parted ways—conduct that people would find more ac-
ceptable because a relationship has effectively ended.429 Thus, this 
evidence should not be admissible to impeach Jennifer’s character 
for truthfulness. 
Consequently, the court in Jennifer’s case has only one specific 
act of untruthfulness to consider: the loan application. This is an act 
that could speak to a person’s character for untruthfulness and can 
lead a juror to think that a witness might lie in court. However, in 
order to admit the evidence for impeachment purposes, the court 
should examine the available extrinsic evidence and verify that there 
is some proof that such a specific act occurred. If it turns out that the 
                                                                                                             
 426 See Elizabeth Weil, Unmarried Spouses Have a Way with Words, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/fashion/unmarried-
spouses-have-a-way-with-words.html. 
 427 Id. 
 428 Because infidelity inherently encompasses lying, common sense would 
dictate that a juror would attach more meaning to infidelity when assessing a wit-
ness’s truthfulness. However, courts have routinely prohibited the introduction of 
this evidence as being more prejudicial than probative. See, e.g., United States v. 
Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Evidence Defendant bore the man’s 
child while married to another does not appear to be relevant or probative of De-
fendant’s truthfulness or untruthfulness.”); United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 
916 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Attempted impeachment of [witness] by proof of [marital] 
infidelity would have been impermissible.”). 
 429 See generally Jessica Blankenship, What Does and Does Not Count as 
Cheating, THOUGHT CATALOG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://thoughtcatalog.com/jessica-
blankenship/2014/01/what-does-and-does-not-count-as-cheating/(discussing 
how it is not considered cheating to move on when partners decide to go “on a 
break”). 
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defense has extrinsic evidence that gives it a reasonable basis to ask 
about the loan application, the court should also inquire as to the 
remoteness of the act. In this case, the loan application seems to be 
from six years prior to the current proceedings in Jennifer’s case. 
The proposed Rule looks at evidence of acts older than five years 
with distrust. The weight of the evidence of distrust should be di-
minished by the lack of evidence regarding previous allegations of 
SGBV. Thus, the evidence of the loan application should be ex-
cluded as its probative value is at most, closely balanced by the un-
fair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, and the Rule would require 
exclusion in such a close case. 
It could have been different if there were prior criminal or ad-
ministrative accusations of SGBV that were recanted or not proven; 
if those recanted or prior accusations could not be explained by Jen-
nifer; if the prior act of untruthfulness was more recent; and if the 
defense had witnesses of reputation speaking of Jennifer’s character 
for untruthfulness, then the court’s conclusion about the admissibil-
ity of the loan application may have been different. The court prob-
ably would allow the impeachment of Jennifer with the loan appli-
cation had those other factors been present. Nevertheless, the im-
peachment would be limited to show that Jennifer lied in the loan 
application. According to Rule 416X, the examination about that act 
should be limited to whether the witness engaged in the prior act of 
untruthfulness. 
Therefore, in Jennifer’s case none of the specific acts should be 
used to impeach her character for truthfulness. As a result, the de-
fense would only be able to impeach her using the evidence of bias, 
contradiction, perception, and lack of verification. During the trial, 
some of that admissible evidence that exposes customary victim be-
havior would have been explained by Jennifer in her testimony or 
by expert witnesses. However, with the lack of evidence regarding 
specific acts of untruthfulness, the defense would have been pre-
cluded from accessing the biases discussed in Part II. This would 
prevent the defense from unfairly discounting Jennifer’s credibility 
and in turn, would make the adjudication of Jennifer’s case fairer 
and more accurate. 
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V. #EVERYDAYSEXISM: OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC IMPEACHMENT 
RULES FOR SGBV VICTIMS 
Well, it’s a tough thing going on. If you can be an exemplary 
person for 35 years, and then somebody comes and they say you did 
this or that, and they give three witnesses, and the three witnesses—
at this point—do not corroborate what she was saying. It’s a very 
scary situation where you’re guilty until proven innocent. My whole 
life, my whole life I’ve heard you’re innocent until proven guilty, but 
now you’re guilty until proven innocent. That is a very, very difficult 
standard. . . .Well I say that it’s a very scary time for young men in 
America when you can be guilty of something that you may not be 
guilty of.430 
 
Even if the proposal of this Article is a more sensible way to 
tackle some of the issues that victims of SGBV confront, potential 
detractors of the proposal would argue that it is not needed. They 
might argue that even if it is needed, it could create other problems 
such as curtailing the rights of defendants, it could lead to over-con-
viction of false accusations, and it could overburden the judicial sys-
tem. Furthermore, detractors might criticize the proposal as not gen-
der specific when it tries to attend to issues of SGBV, that it re-
sponds to an unfounded SGBV exceptionalism, or that it could be 
resolved by abolishing the use of character for untruthfulness evi-
dence. However, these objections are meritless. 
First, there is a serious problem with the adjudication of SGBV 
cases and victim’s and women’s credibility biases.431 Some detrac-
tors might argue that if there is a problem it could be attended with 
                                                                                                             
 430 CNN, President Trump: Scary Time for Young Men in America, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUEBZmuzYQM (President 
Trump talking to reporters outside of the White House at 6:39–7:29); see also 
Monique Judge, Opinion, When Donald Trump Says ’It’s a Scary Time for Young 
Men in America,’ He Means Young White Men, ROOT (Oct. 2, 2018, 8:01 
PM), https://www.theroot.com/when-donald-trump-says-its-a-scary-time-for-
young-men-i-1829479262. 
 431 See supra Part II. 
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instructions to the jurors.432 Those instructions exist today.433 Most 
instructions tell jurors that just because a juror does not believe part 
of the testimony of a witness does not mean that the juror should not 
give credence to the rest of the witness’s testimony.434 However, as 
discussed supra Part II, jurors are not able to compartmentalize ev-
idence in that way.435 Even Professor Bennett Capers, a proponent 
of jury instructions, recognizes that rethinking the Rules of Evidence 
to cover functional evidence is consistent with the overall goals of 
the Rules.436 
Regarding the other objections the Rule’s detractors might have, 
they are not actual problems. But rather, except for the SGBV ex-
ceptionalism critique, they might be an extension of the biases dis-
cussed associated with these types of cases. 
A.  Defendants’ Rights 
Detractors might argue that the Rule erodes the right of confron-
tation of defendants in criminal cases and that it shifts the burden of 
proof, by automatically believing the victims’ allegations.437 Yet, 
                                                                                                             
 432 See Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 898–900 (arguing 
for jury instructions that instruct jurors to disregard functional evidence consid-
ered by jurors, such as race and clothes); but see J. Alexander Tanford, The Law 
and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 95 (“The empirical re-
search clearly demonstrates that instructions to disregard are ineffective in reduc-
ing the harm caused by inadmissible evidence and improper arguments.”). 
 433 See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 4.15 (3rd ed. 2016). 
 434 An example of this type of instruction is the following: 
If you decide that a witness deliberately testified falsely about 
a material point, [that is, about a matter that could affect the 
outcome of this trial,] you may for that reason alone choose to 
disbelieve the rest of his or her testimony. But you are not re-
quired to do so. You should consider not only the deliberate 
falsehood but also all other factors bearing on the witness’s 
credibility in deciding whether to believe other parts of [his] 
[her] testimony. 
Id. 
 435 See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 58, at 1053. 
 436 Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 900–01. 
 437 See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54 (arguing that prosecutors 
can oftentimes secure a conviction solely with eye-witness testimony and that “ju-
rors [need] to presume innocence until they hear credible evidence proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Sherry Colb, What Does #BelieveWomen 
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what the Rule intends to do is to make sure that the evidence used 
to impeach the victims is relevant. The Rule does not exclude evi-
dence that has been shown to be relevant, even where the reliability 
of such evidence has been doubted. Because the Rule only excludes 
evidence that is not relevant, the right of confrontation of the de-
fendant is not violated. 
The defendant does not have a right to introduce evidence that 
is not relevant.438 Moreover, the Rule protects the right of confron-
tation by providing a hearing to elucidate the relevancy of evidence 
whose probative value has been called into question. Similarly, the 
defendant, as in Jennifer’s case,439 still has at his disposal impeach-
ment with evidence of bias, contradiction, perception, and lack of 
verification; focusing on the actual lies rather than on a witness’s 
status as a liar. 
Moreover, the argument that the Rule subverts the burden of 
proof by giving full credence to the victim and assuming the defend-
ant is guilty unless proven otherwise is a fallacy.440 The Rule does 
no such a thing. Such an objection is based on some of the narratives 
associated with the “he said/she said” credibility bias.441 The Rule 
merely requires the defendant to assert the relevancy of the evidence 
to be used to impeach the victim. The factors used for that determi-
nation do not assume that the victim is telling the truth about the 
events or that the defendant is guilty of the charges. What the Rule 
does is balance factors to ascertain whether the evidence could be 
                                                                                                             
Mean?, YONKERS TRIB., (Nov.7, 2018, 1:45 PM), https://www.yonkerstrib-
une.com/2018/11/what-does-believewomen-mean-by-sherry-f-colb. 
 438 See, e.g., Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 321 (D.C. 1990) (“Be-
cause the Constitution does not require confrontation of witnesses with irrelevant 
evidence, the very applicability of the confrontation clause in this case depends 
on [the victim’s] prior allegations being false. Under these circumstances, the con-
frontation clause does not prevent the trial court from weighing the [defendant’s] 
offer of proof to determine its probative value to the trier of fact.”) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); State v. Brum, 923 A.2d 1068, 1074–76 (N.H. 2007) (hold-
ing that defendant was not entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence of victim’s 
prior allegations of sexual assault and that the limitation on cross-examination did 
not violate defendant’s state constitutional right to confrontation). 
 439 See supra Part I. 
 440 See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54. 
 441 See id. 
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used to show character for untruthfulness without confusing the ju-
rors about the matter at trial. Therefore, the Rule does not violate 
any constitutional rights of the defendant. 
B.  Over-Conviction of False Accusations 
Criticisms that the proposed Rule will result in over-convictions 
are also unwarranted. While the Rule is intended to correct the prob-
lem of under-conviction and under-adjudication in favor of vic-
tims,442 that does not mean that the Rule will shift the balance to the 
opposite side to over-conviction. Even though the Rule does make 
it easier to obtain convictions, it does so in light of the current 
scheme that makes it extremely hard. Moreover, the Rule does not 
change any burden of proof or substantive elements of SGBV causes 
of actions. Consequently, there should be no shift to over-convic-
tions. 
This objection seems to be based more on biases about victims 
in SGBV cases lying or trying to advance future litigation in divorce 
or child custody and support cases.443 However, statistics contradict 
                                                                                                             
 442 See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8. 
 443 See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 170 (explaining that women are perceived 
as liars when they revise their stories, despite revisionism being a part of the cop-
ing process); Trepiccione, supra note 240, at 1490–91 (discussing how battered 
mothers are oftentimes charged with neglect and lose custody of their children). 
Another reason that serves to explain the perception that victims in SGBV cases 
are lying is that victims do not usually conform their stories to the legal standards, 
which in turn leads to intensive fact-finding from law enforcement, attorneys, or 
judges leading them to think that victims are lying or fabricating facts. See Epstein 
& Goodman, supra note 93, at 418–19. As Professors Epstein and Goodman ex-
plain:  
survivors often frame their courtroom stories in a way that fails 
to fit the expectations of most judges, and even of the law itself: 
what may feel to victims like the most insidious and intimate 
brand of abuse can come across to legal gatekeepers as some-
thing that really doesn’t count as abuse at all. 
The result is what philosophers call a serious “epistemic asym-
metry” between marginally situated survivors and the judges 
who serve as their audience . . . . 
It is often only after aggressive judicial questioning that survi-
vors volunteer information about physical abuse or threats, and 
when they do, they may sound—to the judges, at any rate—less 
concerned about those aspects of their stories than about the 
day-to-day psychic harms they have endured. In this context, 
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these impressions. The prevalence of false reporting is low;444 it is 
estimated that false reporting lies between two and ten percent.445 
For example, a study of eight communities in the United States 
found the rate of false reporting as seven percent.446 In another study 
of sexual assault cases, the reported rate of false reports was 
5.9%.447 These statistics, combined with the low rates of adjudica-
tion,448 suggest that it is very unlikely that a rule that focuses only 
on the determination of relevancy of evidence for character for un-
truthfulness would have the effect of over-convicting defendants. 
The Rule proposed in this Article attempts to better determine 
whether a victim truly has a character for untruthfulness. In other 
words, the Rule should serve to better identify the victims that are 
actually lying. Consequently, the problem of over-conviction should 
not be an issue because the Rule would actually try to help weed out 
the cases involving false allegations. 
The potential argument that the proposed Rule would promote 
victims misusing allegations of SGBV to better their chances in sep-
arate future litigations is likewise unwarranted. The proposed Rule 
does not facilitate the conviction or adjudication of false allegations. 
Thus, there is no incentive to bring false charges because they would 
likely be barred by the proposed Rule. 
                                                                                                             
the admission of physical abuse can sound to judges like some-
thing of an afterthought. Because so many judges do not under-
stand survivors’ frames for their experiences, they may suspect 
that women’s too-little, too-late testimony about physical vio-
lence is either exaggerated or fabricated out of whole cloth; that 
they are adding it only after belatedly realizing that the law de-
mands such facts. 
Id. 
 444 See, e.g., id. 
 445 Id. 
 446 KIMBERLY LONSWAY ET AL., FALSE REPORTS: MOVING BEYOND THE ISSUE 
TO SUCCESSFULLY INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE NON-STRANGER SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR. 2 (2009), https://www. nsvrc. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/2018-10/Lisak-False-Reports-Moving-be-
yond.pdf. 
 447 David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten 
Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329 (2010). 
 448 See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8. 
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Furthermore, the outcome of an SGBV case has no bearing on 
the outcome of most divorce proceedings.449 Similarly, SGBV alle-
gations have little effect in most alimony determinations.450 In terms 
of child custody and support cases, statistics show that victims of 
SGBV are actually more likely to lose custody after making asser-
tions of violence against another.451 In fact, in some states, bringing 
a case of SGBV against a spouse or a cohabitant could be used 
against the victim in custody determination based on the idea that 
the victim endangered the child by staying in the relationship and 
not reporting the violence.452 However, some states have presump-
tions for joint custody that are enforced even in cases of intimate 
                                                                                                             
 449 First, with the advent of no-fault divorce, a great percentage of jurisdictions 
no longer consider fault in property division distribution unless the abuse was 
egregious. See id. Other states that still consider fault do so only if spousal abuse 
constitutes economic fault (i.e., the economic impact that the abuse may have had 
on medical bills or decreased ability to work), while other jurisdictions demand a 
connection between the abuse and some other factor. Id. Finally, some states con-
sider spousal abuse as a relevant factor in and of itself. Id. Therefore, the argument 
that victims use SGBV cases to enhance their chances in divorce litigation ignores 
the multiarray of how fault plays into property division determinations. It also 
disregards that marriage rates continue to decrease. See Marriage Rate in the 
United States from 1990 to 2017 (per 1,000 of population), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/195951/marriage-rate-in-the-united-states-
since-1990/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). Likewise, the argument overlooks that 
there would only be an incentive to institute an SGBV case to affect the outcome 
of a divorce settlement in cases where the parties actually have substantial assets 
to divide, which might not be majority of cases. See Stacy Francis, Money Stress 
Traps Many Women into Staying in Unhappy Marriages, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/13/money-stress-traps-many-women-into-stay-
ing-in-unhappy-marriages.html. 
 450 See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considera-
tions for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 61, 68 (2008) (“With the advent of no-fault divorce, alimony [has] 
also lost its punitive rationale.”); see also THE HOUSE OF RUTH MD. DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE LEGAL CLINIC ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM 
EFFECTIVELY IN MARYLAND DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 144–45 (2019) (dis-
cussing how alimony awards in Maryland consider domestic violence, under the 
estrangement factor, because alimony is based on financial need and not punitive). 
 451 Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 431. Shockingly, abusive parents 
are more likely to seek sole custody and succeed at a rate of seventy percent. 10 
Myths About Custody and Domestic Violence and How to Counter Them, A.B.A. 
COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (2006), http://leadershipcoun-
cil.org/docs/ABA_custody_myths.pdf. 
 452 Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, at 51. 
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partner violence.453 Thus, married or partnered women are actually 
disincentivized to allege SGBV allegations if the women are also 
planning on litigating any of these family law matters in the future. 
C.  Burden to the Judicial System 
Regarding the potential objection to the proposed Rule that it 
burdens an already burdened system,454 the detractors would be jus-
tified in pointing out that requiring a separate hearing would in-
crease the costs for the judicial system, the costs for the parties, and 
the time that it would take to resolve a matter. However, a cost-ben-
efit analysis shows that the benefits of adopting the proposed Rule 
outweigh its costs. For instance, making sure that the system ac-
counts for the patriarchal biases and attempts to correct those biases 
by delivering more accurate outcomes in cases of SGBV is an ex-
tremely valuable benefit. The under-prosecution of SGBV is a sig-
nificant problem.455 Adopting the proposed Rule could help fix 
some of the problems associated with such under-prosecution and 
promote the notion that women and victims of this type of violence 
matter. Refusal to reform or start to fix some of these problems only 
reifies the issues of looking at victims of this type of violence as 
people who do not count. 
                                                                                                             
 453 Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody 
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 428 (2005). 
 454 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-
civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746 (“Civil suits . . . are piling up in some of the na-
tion’s federal courts, leading to long dealys in cases involving Social Security 
benefits, personal injury and civil rights, among others.”). 
 455 See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8. For example, 
under-prosecution of intimate partner violence can negatively impact the econ-
omy because women are not able to fully participate in the job market. See NAT’L 
COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www. 
speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence2.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
“Victims of intimate partner violence lose a total of 8,000,000 million days of 
paid work each year. . . . [In addition, i]ntimate partner violence is estimated to 
cost the US economy between $5.8 billion and $12.6 billion annually, up to 
0.125% of the national gross domestic product.” Id. 
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Refusing to adopt the proposed Rule when the evidentiary sys-
tem has adopted analogous rules in other contexts, such as with ex-
pert testimony,456 would confirm that this is a matter of gender op-
pression. The only reason that could explain the adoption of a rule 
in one context and not the other is the difference in whom is being 
protected. This discrepancy reveals the gender biases that pervade 
the legal system. Adopting this proposal would demonstrate a recog-
nition that there is a need for reform in this area of our evidentiary 
law, just as the creation of Daubert hearings served to prove that 
there was a need for reform in the context of expert testimony. 
On the other hand, the proposed Rule does not need to be 
adopted as a whole. Jurisdictions could adopt versions that are less 
burdensome. For example, a state could theoretically adopt a version 
of the proposed Rule that dispenses with the trilateral process. Or a 
state could adopt a version of the Rule that holds the preliminary 
admissibility hearing outside the presence of the jury but that does 
not require a separate judge to preside over the hearing. Another al-
ternative could be to use the proposed Rule’s standard for specific 
acts for untruthfulness of the victim but to forego the preliminary 
hearing. A fourth option could be to use the most stringent standard 
in the proposed Rule when assessing all forms of character for un-
truthfulness evidence, regardless of level of reliability. 
However, as it stands today, the pervasiveness of the gender bi-
ases is so widespread457 that some level of precautions or safeguards 
is needed. Perhaps, as time passes, the biases in adjudicating these 
types of cases would naturally subside and the proposed safeguards 
would no longer be needed. In that case, the cost of implementing 
the Rule would be high initially but it could be reduced significantly 
as time passes and the biases fade. The Rule should achieve this in 
two ways. First, the proposed Rule itself serves as an educational 
tool to inform society of the existence of the biases discussed. Sec-
ond, the safeguards put in place by the Rule should hopefully serve 
as a deterrent to defendants that would otherwise try to impeach vic-
tims with evidence that would not meet the established minimum 
                                                                                                             
 456 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 
(1993) (establishing a procedure for determining whether an expert is qualified 
under FRE 702 to protect parties from the admission of expert testimony based 
on shoddy science). 
 457 See supra Part II. 
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standards of the Rule. As the application of the Rule becomes settled 
law, parties would likely start to understand when they can use spe-
cific acts of untruthfulness to impeach and when they cannot. This 
would lead to a decrease in costs of implementing the Rule over time 
and ultimately increase the efficiency of the judicial system. 
Another way to reduce the monetary and procedural burdens of 
the Rule would be to have trained judges preside over the prelimi-
nary admissibility hearings for a regular, set period of time. Opti-
mizing the processes of the Rule, as well as developing and improv-
ing them could be a way to reduce the overall costs of the Rule. 
Because the proposed Rule is so adaptable, the argument that such 
a Rule merely imposes burdens on the system is just another excuse 
to continue ignoring a problem that needs urgent attention. 
D.  No Gender Specific Rule 
Detractors might also argue that the proposed Rule should not 
be drafted in gender-neutral language because the Rule is supposed 
to deal with a problem that disproportionately affects women.458 
First, this seems to be a contradiction. Second, there is no reason to 
believe that the gender-neutral language could benefit men at the 
expense of women. Such objections overestimate the scope of the 
proposed Rule. 
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the Rule be drafted in 
gender neutral terms, unless it is substantially related to a govern-
ment interest.459 Because of the Equal Protection Clause, if the prob-
lem of impeachment using evidence of character for untruthfulness 
is to be addressed, it must be done in gender-neutral terms. That does 
not necessarily open the door to men to misuse the Rule in their fa-
vor. The gender-neutral language of the Rule does not mean that 
                                                                                                             
 458 See Number of Rape or Sexual Assault Victims in the United States per 
Year from 2000 to 2017, by Gender, supra note 2 (showing that women are more 
likely to be be a victim of rape or sexual assault as compared to men). 
 459 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 
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men could file false accusations to prevent accusations against them 
or that they could use the Rule to avoid being impeached for their 
own character for untruthfulness. The Rule, as discussed, does not 
change any of the protections for defendants or any of the other sub-
stantive rules regarding SGBV cases. Thus, there is no need to be 
preoccupied with the gender-neutral language of the rule. 
In terms of the Rule being distorted by its applicability to both 
male and female victims, that argument ignores that male victims 
could be subjected to the same biases in the context of SGBV be-
cause of the phenomenon of feminization of victims.460 Similar to 
what happens to aggressors that are associated with male character-
istics and perceived as more credible,461 the feminization of victims 
leads to the association of male victims with the biases and stereo-
types typically attributed to women.462 A perfect example of this 
phenomenon is what happened to Nimrod Reitman, when he ac-
cused by his former graduate advisor, Professor Avital Ronell, of 
sexually harassing him.463 Reitman confronted the same types of at-
tacks on his credibility that female victims are usually subjected to 
in the public forum and during trial.464 
Consequently, male victims might also need to be protected un-
der Rule 416X because of the feminization of victims that occurs in 
these types of cases even when the victim is a male.465 Thus, the 
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critique of the gender-neutral language as a distortion or contradic-
tion is not justified. 
E.  SGBV Exceptionalism 
Finally, some detractors, based on Professor Erin R. Collins’ 
idea of evidentiary domestic violence exceptionalism,466 might ar-
gue that this proposed Rule encourages a similar exceptionalism and 
perpetuates some of the associated harms. Specifically, Collins ar-
gues that many jurisdictions have enacted specialized evidence rules 
(i.e., character evidence exceptions, relaxed forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing rule, and hearsay exceptions) predicated on the front-end prose-
cutorial differential approach,467 which disregards the lack of justi-
fications to extend this exceptionalism to trials. She further illus-
trates that this evidentiary intervention is premised on a mistaken 
application of the already shaky battered woman syndrome defense 
and on the dominance feminism theory, which is not responsive to 
the particular needs of the parties involved.468 This practice compro-
mises the integrity of the criminal justice system and reduces the 
efficacy of the interventions by inadvertently harming and discred-
iting the victims who do not support prosecution.469 
However, the proposed Rule is not built on a shaky defense that 
is wrongly applied in cases beyond its original scope. Instead, the 
Rule is influenced by observations and analyses from various schol-
ars as to how society discounts victims. Additionally, even if the 
analysis departs from the premise that the current rule serves to re-
inforce the subordination of women, the Rule does not remove 
choice from state actors.470 Rather the Rule directs state choice and 
tries to educate states as to the biases that have created problems. 
Further, the proposed Rule does not perpetuate the harms of ex-
ceptionalism. As discussed, the use of character for untruthfulness 
evidence in and of itself compromises our adjudication system by 
searching for liars instead of lies.471 The proposed Rule attempts to 
                                                                                                             
 466 Collins, supra note 260, at 414. 
 467 Id. at 412–14. 
 468 See id. at 408–10, 414. 
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 471 See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 221. 
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correct this failure in SGBV cases where the negative effects of the 
current evidentiary rules seem to be most severe.472 The proposed 
Rule is also not intended to be used against victims that do not wish 
to prosecute the offender. For that reason, the Rule is not intended 
to be used in cases of hostile witnesses, which is also why the Rule 
opens up the possibility of a trilateral process. The goal of the Rule 
is not to ease the prosecution of particular crimes, but rather to cor-
rect the imbalance of how we currently discount victims in SGBV 
cases. Although the natural result of the proposed reform is a better 
prosecution of the crime, better prosecution is not cause for a relax-
ation of the rules or special concessions during the trial. 
Some might argue evidence of character for untruthfulness 
should be barred altogether.473 Yet, banning all character evidence 
does not remove that evidence from coming in through judicial ac-
tion.474 In addition, reliance on this type of evidence is still very 
prevalent across the country.475 Because character evidence does not 
seem to be going anywhere anytime soon in our current systems, we 
have to focus instead on removing the credibility biases against 
SGBV victims. 
#WOMENSREALITY: CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement is accomplishing what sexual harass-
ment law to date has not. 
This mass mobilization against sexual abuse, through an un-
precedented wave of speaking out in conventional and social media, 
is eroding the two biggest barriers to ending sexual harassment in 
law and in life: the disbelief and trivializing dehumanization of its 
victims.476 
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As Catharine MacKinnon points out, the #MeToo movement is 
eroding the “disbelief and trivializing dehumanization” of SGBV 
victims.477 However, as this Article explains, our evidentiary system 
has systemic barriers that impede that erosion from flowing into our 
judicial proceedings. 
Current evidentiary rules galvanize credibility biases against 
SGBV victims in trials via the introduction of evidence regarding 
the victims’ character for untruthfulness.478 Attorneys use this evi-
dence, which in most cases is of low probative value,479 to discount 
SGBV victims. Even in jurisdictions where there are more stringent 
limitations on the use of character for untruthfulness evidence, 
courts carve out specific SGBV exceptions to their impeachment 
rules and allow this evidence to come in and be used to attack vic-
tims’ characters.480 
This defense strategy correlates with the underreporting, under-
conviction, and under-favorable adjudication of SGBV cases.481 
Our current rules, that should serve to guarantee the fairness of the 
judicial proceedings by discouraging the use of reprehensible tactics 
and protecting witnesses from undue harassment,482 have proven to 
be insufficient to guarantee the redress of SGBV. “If we operate 
with norms of credibility that do not take into account the influence 
of background beliefs and of prejudice on our credibility judgments, 
there is a very real risk of committing epistemic injustice.”483 For 
that reason, this Article proposes amending the current evidentiary 
rules to prevent attorneys from using credibility biases associated 
with trustworthiness and plausibility against SGBV victims during 
trials. 
The proposed Rule attempts to implement reform while still re-
specting the long-standing tradition of impeaching witnesses with 
evidence of character for untruthfulness. The Rule is drafted so that 
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it follows constitutional mandates, avoids over-correction, and pro-
motes judicial efficiency. As a result, the Rule provides for three 
different balancing tests depending on the type of character for un-
truthfulness evidence involved. The Rule lists concrete factors to aid 
the courts in weighing the probative value of the character for un-
truthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects in the context of 
SGBV cases. 
For evidence in the form of opinion or reputation by a witness 
other than the defendant, which is perceived by society to be the 
most reliable form of character for untruthfulness evidence,484 the 
balance remains the one set in FRE 403 (i.e., that the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effects). However, for 
the less reliable types of evidence (i.e., prior convictions for crimes 
other than crimen falsi and specific acts of non-criminal untruthful-
ness),485 the Rule provides that impeachment with character for un-
truthfulness evidence would be prohibited if the probative value of 
the evidence of the victim’s untruthful character is closely balanced 
or outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the 
confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility 
of misleading the jury or the judge. Finally, for evidence in the form 
of prior convictions for crimen falsi, prior convictions older than 
five years, or opinion or reputation supported solely by the defend-
ant, the Rule establishes that the balancing test would be whether 
the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effects. 
Additionally, where the evidence of character for untruthfulness 
is in the form of specific acts, the Rule requires a preliminary ad-
missibility hearing presided over by a separate judge or magistrate. 
During that hearing or when the victim testifies at trial, if the inter-
ests of the victim are not being adequately represented, the Rule pro-
vides for the appointment of an independent counsel for the victim. 
With these amendments to the current impeachment rules, attor-
neys should be prevented from accessing credibility biases during 
trial and discounting the testimony of witnesses. That, as a result, 
would ameliorate the revictimization of SGBV victims, foster fairer 
adjudications, and incentivize victims to come forward. This would 
slowly start correcting the problems of underreporting, under-con-
viction, and under-favorable adjudication of SGBV cases. 
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“[T]he efficacy of the judicial decision-making process rests on 
the popular belief of judicial fairness.”486 Historically, our system 
has denied that fairness to women, especially when redressing vio-
lence targeted towards them.487 As Professor Anita Hill has pointed 
out, the changes our judicial system has experienced in the redress-
ing of SGBV claims have come glacially slow.488 The proposal pre-
sented in this Article is hopefully one catalyst that would accelerate 
that glacially slow change. 
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